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The National Labor Relations Board’s current analysis of union organizers’
right to access employer property relies almost exclusively on an employer’s 
right-to-exclude under state property law. If the employer possesses such a 
right, an attempt to exclude organizers will generally be lawful; if the 
employer lacks that right, the exclusions will be unlawful. This scheme makes 
little sense doctrinally and, perhaps more importantly, the Board’s attempts to 
implement it have been dreadful.  An employer’s property interests are usually
irrelevant to the issue that should be the Board’s primary concern in these 
cases—whether the removal of union organizers interferes with employees’
federal labor rights.  Employees will tend to view hostile or discriminatory 
exclusions of organizing activity as coercive, whether or not the employer has 
a right-to-exclude under state law.  Further, because the property rights issue 
is often complex, an employer cannot be sure of its ability to exclude 
organizers until litigation has ended.  Thus, an employer is forced to decide 
whether to allow what is arguably a trespass, or protect its property interests 
and risk a labor law violation.
The focus on state property rights has also confounded the Board.  The 
uproar accompanying the 2005 Supreme Court decision in Kelo v. City of New 
London is an illustration of the intense concern for property rights that has 
long imposed limits on the Board’s enforcement of federal labor law.  Yet, the 
Board has no expertise in the wide variety of state property law issues that it 
must address.  This incapability has resulted in protracted litigation and often 
poorly-reasoned analyses that are ineffective in enforcing the property interests 
that the Board is supposed to be protecting.  I propose, therefore, a new 
analysis that eliminates consideration of state property rights from the Board’s 
right-to-access cases.  Under the proposal, the Board would focus on whether 
the manner in which an employer excludes organizers chills employee rights, 
while property issues—such as a trespass claim against organizers—would be 
determined by state courts.  By creating a set of presumptions to guide 
employer conduct in responding to organizing activity, the proposal would 
provide clarity for all parties, better protect employees’ labor rights, and free
the Board from its struggles with state property law.
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2Imagine that you are the manager of a restaurant located, along with several other 
businesses, on the first-floor of a high-rise building.  One afternoon, just before a shift 
change, several members of a local union stand on the sidewalk near the entrance to the
restaurant and distribute flyers to employees encouraging them to join the union.  The 
handbilling is peaceful and does not block the entrance.  In the past, the owner has 
emphasized that solicitors are not welcome and are you confident that union organizing 
would not be an exception.  What should you do?
If you are a typical manager, you would immediately tell the organizers to leave 
and, if they refuse, pursue other means—such as calling the police or security 
personnel—to stop the organizing. By doing so, however, you put your employer at risk 
of violating the National Labor Relations Act (“Act” or “NLRA”).1  Currently, the only 
way of knowing whether a violation occurred is to wait for the National Labor Relations 
Board (“Board” or “NLRB”) to resolve the dispositive issue in almost all such cases:  
whether the employer had a state property right to exclude the organizers.  But even if 
you were one of the rare managers who was aware of that rule, it often will provide little 
help when faced with organizing activity.  You must know whether your employer or the 
building owner controls or owns the sidewalk; although the lease would likely provide 
the answer, few managers would have immediate access to that document.  If the building
owner controls the sidewalk, you could ask her to remove the organizers, but her right to 
do so is not clear.  For instance, even if the building owner built, maintains, and even 
owns the sidewalk, she may have obtained the property from the city with conditions 
requiring public access.  Or, as is likely, there may be a public right-of-way on the 
1
 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169.
3sidewalk.  Yet, different states allow varying degrees of control and public access over 
such easements.2
These questions are not far-fetched.  Rather, they signify a fairly common set of 
issues in Board right-to-access cases.  Not surprisingly, the Board—whose official
expertise is solely the administration of the NLRA—is not well-suited to decide issues of 
state property law.  The result is delay, poor administration of the NLRA, and possible 
interference with state property rights.  Therefore, this Article proposes a rule that
eliminates the issue of state property law from the Board’s right-to-access cases and, 
instead, focuses on the manner in which the employer tried to remove the organizers.  In 
short, the Board would no longer consider state property rights; instead, it would presume 
that an employer’s peaceful request to stop organizing activity on what appears to be its
property is lawful, and presume that any action going beyond such a request violates the 
NLRA.3 This change would provide both organizers and employers clarity in 
understanding the consequences of their actions.  Moreover, the proposal would allow for 
better enfo rcement of labor rights and eliminate a source of federal encroachment on state 
property law.
Although concern for property interests vis-à-vis government regulation has been 
strong for several decades,4 the Supreme Court’s 2005 public use decision in Kelo v. City 
of New London5 set off a storm of popular criticism indicating that this concern may be 
2
 Moreover, state property law may limit property owners’ ability to exclude organizers under theories such 
as consent or privilege.  See Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 10, 892A; infra note 225.
3 See infra Section II.A.
4
 As early as 1965, Professor Gould—prior to becoming NLRB Chairman—noted that, although “subject to 
reasonable use in other areas of the law, curiously the concept of property rights has become a rallying cry 
in the field of labor law” that traditionally provided “an absolute defense against those who would engage 
in union activity.”  William B. Gould, Union Organizational Rights and the Concept of “Quasi-Public” 
Property, 49 MINN. L. REV. 505, 509 (1965).
5
 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005).
4growing.6 That potential growth is significant, as attempts to protect property rights have 
already imposed substantial limits on the enforcement of various areas of law, 
particularly labor.7 A series of Supreme Court holdings8 has used private property rights 
to circumscribe the Board’s ability to protect federal labor rights; ironically, however, the 
Board’s attempt to follow that precedent harms property interests through the delay and 
inexpert judgments that one would expect from a federal labor agency’s interpretation of
state law.
The problem with the Board ’s current analysis is more prevalent and serious than 
one might imagine.  Many employers have worksites that are on, or near, property that 
they do not fully control.  For instance, a mall employer may lack control over nearby 
walkways and parking lots, as well as the store property itself.9 Moreover, states have 
widely differing laws regulating the use of certain types of property.  Pennsylvania, for 
example, allows public use of a public right-of-way only to the extent that the activity is 
expressly authorized by the relevant municipality and permits an abutting landowner to
6 See, e.g., Tresa Baldas, States Ride Post-’Kelo’ Wave of Legislation, NAT’L L.J. (Aug. 2, 2005) 
(describing development in various states to prevent use of eminent domain for private development in 
response to popular criticism of Kelo).
7 As stated by Professor Estlund, “[t]he history of labor law has been, in large measure, the history of 
property rights.”  Cynthia L. Estlund, Labor, Property, and Sovereignty After Lechmere, 46 STAN. L. REV. 
305, 306 (1994); see supra note 4. 
8 See infra Section I.
9 See Venetian Casino Resort, L.L.C. v. Local Joint Executive Bd., 257 F.3d 937, 942-43 (9th Cir. 2001) 
(holding that employer lacked right to exclude from sidewalk that it built on its private property, based on 
terms of agreement with city to widen road in front of casino); UFCW v. NLRB (Farm Fresh), 222 F.3d
1030, 1034-36 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (noting that employer’s no-solicitation rule applied to entrances of mall 
stores with different leases providing varying levels of control, and positing that state would recognize 
“something akin to an implied easement of necessity” for lessee/employer); Weis Mkts., 325 N.L.R.B. 871, 
883-85 (1998) (concluding that Pennsylvania law does not give employer right to exclude union picketers 
because it had right to use common areas), enforcement denied in relevant part, 265 F.3d 239 (4th Cir. 
2001); Great Am., 322 N.L.R.B. 17, 20, 22-23 (1996) (picketing near mall parking lot entrance where 
“record [did] not clearly establish whether the handbillers were standing on public or private property”); 
Food for Less, 318 N.L.R.B. 646, 649-50 (1995) (concluding that employer lacked right-to-exclude under 
state law, despite maintenance of parking lot under lease), enforced in relevant part sub nom. O’Neil’s 
Mkts. v. UFCW, 95 F.3d 733, 739 (8th Cir. 1996).  Other examples include entrances or driveways to a 
worksite that are subject to some public use.  See Johnson & Hardin Co. v. NLRB, 49 F.3d 237, 239 (6th 
Cir. 1995) (union handbilling on state property over which employer possessed easement).
5exclude any unauthorized activity.10 In contrast, New Jersey affirmatively provides the 
right to enter private property to gain access to employees residing on that property. 11
California courts are currently unable to agree on  the extent to which the state permits 
union access to private property.12  In sum, the complexity of state property laws has 
bewildered the Board and, perhaps more importantly, has created grave uncertainty for 
both employers and organizers, who cannot know whether their actions will violate the
NLRA until the culmination of years of confusing and protracted litigation.
The proposal seeks to eliminate that confusion by removing state property law 
issues from the Board’s docket.  Even under the Court’s current right-to-access
jurisprudence, an employer’s state property rights are generally distinct  from federal 
labor interests.  Thus, the proposal intends to focus the Board’ s attention away from state 
property law to where it belongs:  the effect of an employer’s exclusion of organizers on 
employees’ ability to exercise their rights under the NLRA.  The Board’s failure to 
distinguish these two distinct rights has led to the quagmire in which it now finds itself.  
The proposal would free the Board, and federal courts of appeal, from the burden of 
having to delve into state property law issues in which neither possesses expertise.  It
would also provide states better control over their own property law, while conserving 
valuable Board and federal court resources.  Further, the proposal would drastically 
lessen the uncertainty for both employers and organizers in right-to-access cases.  Rather 
than the legality of their actions remaining uncertain pending litigation, the parties would
likely know ex ante whether the Board would find their conduct permissible.  The result 
10 See infra notes 85-87 and accompanying text. 
11
 State v. Shack, 58 N.J. 297, 308 (1971).
12 See infra notes 97-111 and accompanying text. 
6would be less litigation resulting from right-to-access disputes that are more peaceful and 
less likely to infringe employees’ NLRA rights.
Part I of this Article discusses the current right-to-access scheme’s development
and critiques the Board’s interpretation of Supreme Court precedent.  Part II describes the 
proposal and its presumptions’ application to typical factual scenarios.  Finally, Part III 
shows why Board enforcement of the proposal would not constitute an unconstitutional
taking.
I. THE CURRENT RIGHT-TO-ACCESS ANALYSIS
A. The Road to Lechmere 
The starting point for the Board’s current right-to-access analysis is NLRB v. 
Babcock & Wilcox Co.13 At issue in Babcock were employer refusals to allow
nonemployee union organizers to distribute literature in company parking lots.14  The 
Board concluded that the refusals violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by “ unreasonably 
imped[ing]” employees’ right to self-organization.15  The Supreme Court reversed, 
holding that employer private property rights trumped the union’s organizational rights.
The Board had found that the refusals to allow distribution of union literature 
were unlawful because the workplace was the most effective location for employees to 
13
 351 U.S. 105 (1956).
14 Id. at 106. Although this Article refers to “nonemployees” as individuals who are not employees of the 
targeted employer, the NLRA protects “any employee,” including employees of a union or nontargeted
employer.  See 29 U.S.C. § 152(3); see also Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 565 (1978) (holding that 
Section 7 applies outside of immediate employment context); Estlund, supra note 7, at 326.
15 Id.  Section 7 of the NLRA protects employees’ right to “self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor 
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other 
concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.”  29 U.S.C. 
§ 157.  Those rights are enforced through Section 8(a)(1), which provides that “[i]t shall be an unfair labor 
practice for an employer to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise” of their Section 7 
rights.  Id. § 158(a)(1).  An employer violates Section 8(a)(1) when its conduct tends to interfere with, 
restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of their Section 7 rights.  See Retlaw Broad. Co. v. NLRB, 53 
F.3d 1002, 1006 (9th Cir. 1995).
7receive information necessary to freely choose whether to organize.16  That finding was 
based on the Republic Aviation line of cases, which held that employers cannot generally 
restrict discussion of self-organization among employees during non-work time.17
Republic Aviation was one of the earliest cases addressing the tension between 
employees’ federal labor rights and employers’ right to control use of their property.18
Although, under certain circumstances, the exercise of labor rights trumped property 
rights under Republic Aviation and its progeny, employers’ property interests fared much 
better in Babcock.
The Court rejected the Board’s reliance on Republic Aviation, holding that its 
limitations on employer property interests did not apply to nonemployee conduct.19
Although employees had a direct right—a right that the Act explicitly grants to them—to 
discuss self-organization at their workplace, nonemployee union organizers did not.20
The only right nonemployee organizers possessed was a “derivative” right to discuss 
unionization with employees.21 A derivative right is not expressly protected by the Act 
and exists only as a means to foster employees’ exercise of their direct rights; in Babcock, 
16 Babcock, 351 U.S. at 107.  The exclusions were made pursuant to non-solicitation policies that were not 
enforced solely against unions.  Id.
17 Id. at 110, 113 (citing LeTourneau Co., 54 N.L.R.B. 1253, 1262 (1944), affirmed sub nom. Republic 
Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 801 (1945); Peyton Packing Co., 49 N.L.R.B. 828, 843-44 (1943)); 
see also Teletech Holdings, Inc., 333 N.L.R.B. No. 56, 2001 WL 209470, at *2 (2001) (“A no-distribution 
rule which is not restricted to working time and to work areas is overly broad and presumptively invalid.”). 
Exceptions have always been made for production or disciplinary reasons.  See Babcock, 351 U.S. at 110.
18 See Estlund, supra note 7, at 307 & n.6, 347 (citing commentators and noting that Republic Aviation
essentially created an employee forum at work, as long as discussion did not occur on work time and in 
work areas).
19
 351 U.S. at 113 (noting that several courts of appeal had relied on distinction, which the Court held to be 
one of “substance”) (citing NLRB v. Lake Superior Lumber Corp., 167 F.2d 147, 150 (6th Cir. 1948); 
NLRB v. Seamprufe, Inc., 222 F.2d 858, 860 (10th Cir. 1955)).
20
 351 U.S. at 113.
21 Id. at 113 (“The right to self-organization depends in some measure on the ability of employees to learn 
the advantages of self-organization from others.”); see R. Wayne Estes & Adam M. Porter, 
Babcock/Lechmere Revisited:  Derivative Nature of Union Organizers’ Right of Access to Employers’ 
Property Should Impact Judicial Evaluation of Alternatives, 48 SMU L. Rev. 349, 354-56 & n.3 (1995) 
(supporting and citing criticism of Babcock’s employee/nonemployee distinction); Gould, Quasi-Public, 
supra note 4, at 512-13 (describing importance of union-employee contact at workplace).
8the union had a derivative right to inform employees about self-organization, a
prerequisite for employees’ exercise of their direct right to freely choose whether to 
pursue collective representation.22
Despite its acknowledgement of the derivative right to communicate with
employees, the Court severely limited the organizers’ ability to exercise that right in the 
face of employer resistance.  According to the Court, an employer’s exclusion of
nonemployee organizers from employer property is permissible if “reasonable efforts by 
the union through other available channels of communication will enable it to reach the 
employees with its message and the employer’s notice or order does not discriminate 
against the union by allowing other distribution.”23
This rule, by itself, could have struck an equal balance between labor rights and 
property interests, but the Court’s definition of a reasonable alternative favored the latter.  
In particular, the Court—disagreeing with the Board—held that contacting empl oyees in 
public and at their homes through the telephone, letters, and meetings were reasonable 
alternatives to worksite communications.24  Because these alternate methods were 
available to the union, the employer could lawfully stop the parking lot distributions.25
The Court acknowledged that the alternatives available to the union in Babcock 
provided a close question given that the balance between employer’s property rights and 
22 Id.
23
 351 U.S. at 112; see generally Note, Jay Gresham, Still As Strangers:  Nonemployee Organizers on 
Private Commercial Property, 62 TEX. L. REV. 111, 115-22 (1983) (describing development of reasonable 
alternatives analysis). Previously, an employer could not exclude organizers from its property if, for 
example, the property was an in-store public restaurant and the organizing activity was only an “incident to 
the normal use of” the restaurant.  See, e.g., Montgomery Ward & Co., 288 N.L.R.B. 126, 127 (1988) 
(Montgomery Ward II).  However, the Board has overruled that precedent as unsustainable under 
Lechmere.  See Farm Fresh, 326 N.L.R.B. 997, 999 (1998) (overruling Montgomery Ward II and rejecting 
dissent’s argument that it survives Lechmere because it was based on antidiscrimination exception to 
employer’s right-to-exclude), petition for review granted on different grounds sub nom. UFCW v. NLRB 
(Farm Fresh), 222 F.3d 1030, 1033-34 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
24
 351 U.S. at 111.
25 Id. at 112.
9employees’ organization rights “must be obtained with as little destruction of one as is 
consistent with the maintenance of the other.”26  Yet, the Court suggested that its concern 
for employees’ rights did not extend far.27  In noting that the plants at issue were close to 
“well-settled” communities, the Court expressly recognized nonemployees’ right to 
access employer property only in the very limited circumstances in which both the 
workplace and employees’ living quarters were beyond the union’s reach—such as a
remote logging camp.28
For several decades following Babcock, the Board attempted to reconcile the 
decision with its right-to-access analysis.29  Finally, in Jean Country,30 the Board settled 
upon a test that it believed to be consistent with Babcock.  The Board read Babcock and 
intervening Supreme Court decisions31 as requiring the accommodation of property and 
labor rights to reflect the strength of the two interests in a given case; the test, therefore, 
balanced “the degree of impairment of the Section 7 right if access should be denied”
with “the degree of impairment of the private property right if access should be 
granted.”32 Thus, an employer’s attempt to exclude will more likely be lawful if the 
property is not generally open to the public.33 Moreover, a significant factor in 
determining the impairment of labor rights was the “availability of reasonably effective 
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Id. at 113; see generally William B. Gould, The Question of Union Activity on Company Property, 18 
VAND. L. REV. 73, 102-03 (1964) (providing early analysis of “reasonable efforts” inquiry).
29 See, e.g., Fairmont Hotel, 282 N.L.R.B. 139 (1986); see Estlund, supra note 7, at 316-19 (discussing  
post-Babcock development of Board law).
30
 291 N.L.R.B. 11 (1988).
31 See Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 522 (1976) (holding that accommodation between Section 7 and 
property rights “may fall at differing points along the spectrum depending on the nature and strength of the 
respective . . . rights asserted in any given context”); Central Hardware Co. v. NLRB, 407 U.S. 539, 543 
(1972) (holding that Board’s role is to seek proper accommodation between Section 7 rights and private 
property rights).
32 Jean Country, 291 N.L.R.B. at 12, 14.  The Board also emphasized that the Court had extended its 
Babcock rule to right-to-access cases that involved non-organizational activity.  Id.
33 Id. at 14, 16.
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alternative means” of reaching the intended audience.34  According to the Board, the 
availability of newspapers, radio, or television would constitute reasonable alternatives to 
direct contact only in exceptional cases.35
The Jean Country test reflected the Board’s regular practice of balancing 
employee and employer interests.36  That balance, however, was short-lived.  In 
Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB,37 the Court eliminated virtually any notion of balance by
deeming nonemployee labor interests inferior to employer property rights in all but the 
most extraordinary circumstances.
In Lechmere, a union attempted to organize a retail store located in an open 
shopping mall.38 After a full-page newspaper advertisement elicited little response, 
organizers placed handbills on cars parked in the mall lot most used by the store’s 
employees.39 The mall owner immediately told the organizers  to leave, citing its no-
solicitation and handbilling rule.40  Following more handbilling attempts that prompted
the same response, the organizers moved to a nearby strip of public land and distributed
handbills to cars entering and exiting the parking lot before the mall opened and after it 
closed.41 The handbilling, in addition to contacting employees via the state’s license-
plate database, yielded only one employee-signed card seeking union representation.42
34 Id. at 14; see also id. at 13 (discussing other factors, such as Section 7 right at issue, type of property at 
issue, identity of target audience, possibility of affecting neutral employers, dilution of message, and costs 
of alternative means).
35 Id. at 13 (citing NLRB v. United Aircraft Corp., 324 F.2d 128, 130 (2d Cir. 1963) (emphasizing 
superiority of direct contact, and noting high costs of media alternatives)). 
36 See, e.g., NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 393 U.S. 575, 617 (1969) (determining lawfulness of employer 
statements by balancing employer and employee rights).
37
 502 U.S. 527 (1992).
38 Id. at 529-30.
39 Id.
40 Id. at 530 & n.1.
41 Id. at 530.
42 Id.
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The Board, acting on the union’s unfair labor practice charge alleging that the 
mall owner unlawfully barred the organizational activity from its property, applied the 
Jean Country test and found a violation of Section 8(a)(1).43 The First Circuit enforced 
the Board’s order.44 The Court reversed, however, holding that Jean Country was 
impermissible under the NLRA.
Although the Court recognized that nonemployee organizers possessed derivative 
Section 7 rights,45 it emphasized Babcock’s distinction between employees’ right to 
discuss unionism among themselves and nonemployee attempts to inform employees 
about unionism.46 According to the Court, under Babcock, “an employer cannot be 
compelled to allow distribution of union literature by nonemployee organizers on his 
property,” unless no reasonable alternatives are available.47 Despite acknowledging its 
own line of cases citing Babcock’s emphasis that both employee and employer rights 
should be accommodated,48 the Court held that this precedent did not curb “Babcock’s 
holding that an employer need not accommodate nonemployee organizers unless the 
employees are otherwise inaccessible.”49
This interpretation of Babcock struck down the Board’s Jean Country’s balancing 
test.  Where, as in Republic Aviation, an employer attempts to prevent employee -only
discussions, the Court conceded  the Board’s authority to balance employees’ right to 
43
 Lechmere, Inc., 295 N.L.R.B. 94, 94, 98-99 (1988) (concluding also that attempts to exclude union from 
public property were unlawful).
44
 914 F.3d 313 (1st Cir. 1990).
45 Lechmere, 502 U.S. at 532.
46 Id. at 533, 537; see supra note 19; infra note 55.
47
 502 U.S. at 533.
48 Id. at 534, 535 (citing Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180, 205 (1978); Hudgens, 424 U.S.
521-22 (“[T]he locus of that accommodation . . . may fall at differing points along the spectrum depending 
on the nature and the strength of the respective § 7 rights and private property rights asserted in any given 
context.”); Central Hardware, 407 U.S. at 544; Babcock, 351 U.S. at 112 (holding that accommodation of 
different rights “must be obtained with as little destruction of one as is consistent with the maintenance of 
the other”)).  See supra note 31.
49 502 U.S. at 534.
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discuss to unionization against an employer’s right to control use of its property.50
However, where communication with nonemployees was involved, “the Board [is] not 
permitted to engage in that same balancing.”51 Rather, the Lechmere Court construed 
Babcock as proscribing any balance or accommodation of nonemployees’ derivative right 
to contact employees as long as reasonable alternatives exist—“[i]t is only where access 
is infeasible that it becomes necessary and proper to take the accommodation inquiry to a 
second level, balancing the employees’ and employers’ rights.”52
Lechmere has become the foundation for all subsequent right -to-access cases.  
One reason is its reaffirmation that nonemployees have a derivative right to discuss 
unionization with employees.53  More important, however, is its conclusion that this 
derivative right is vastly inferior to employees’ direct right to discuss unionization.  The 
stated rationale for this disparity was simply that employee  activity is fundamentally 
different from nonemployee conduct.54 The Court’s failure to explain this distinction 
further is not surprising, as it is a difficult holding to defend.55
50 Id. at 537.
51 Id.
52 Id. at 537-38 (stating also that “reasonable” means anything that did not require “extraordinary feats to 
communicate with inaccessible employees”).  In the face of Lechmere’s broad construction of reasonable 
means, others have noted that most alternatives are often vastly inferior to direct contact with employees at 
work.  See infra note 74.  Moreover, one of the major alternatives cited in Lechmere—obtaining employee 
information from license-plates—is now illegal under the federal Driver’s Privacy Protection Act of 1994.  
See 29 U.S.C. § 2724(a) (stating that it is generally unlawful to “knowingly obtain[] . . . personal 
information, from a motor vehicle record”); Judge Allows Cintas Workers To Bring Class Action Against 
UNITE HERE, Not IBT, 105 DAILY LABOR REPORT (BNA), June 2, 2005, at AA-2 (discussing class action 
suit against union for obtain home addresses from employee license-plates).  Eliminating that option further 
undermines Lechmere’s conclusion that alternative means, such as signs in a nearby public area or 
advertisements, would be sufficient to communicate with workers of a particular employer.  See Lechmere, 
502 U.S. at 540.
53 Id. at 532; see also UFCW v. NLRB, 74 F.3d 292, 298 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (holding that derivative access 
rights result “entirely from on-site employees’ § 7 organizational right to receive union-related material”).
54
 502 U.S. at 532.
55 See Alan L. Zmija, Union Organizing After Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB—A Time To Reexamine the Rule of 
Babcock v. Wilcox, 12 Hofstra Lab. L.J. 65, 101 (1994) (criticizing employee/nonemployee distinction).
The Board, pre-Lechmere, distinguished workers who were on an employer’s property pursuant to a 
working relationship versus individuals who were “strangers to the property.” See S. Servs., 300 N.L.R.B. 
13
The difference cannot be whether a trespass occurred, for both employee and 
nonemployee organizers can be trespassers.56 Nor can the distinction rely on employees’
regular access to the employer’s worksite, as nonemployees possess similar access to 
employer property regularly open to the public.  One might think, given the context and 
reasoning of Babcock, that the distinction is based on derivative versus direct rights.57
The Board’s post-Lechmere cases, however, have made clear that nonemployee activity, 
even if directly protected, receives less protection vis-à-vis property rights than employee 
activity.
Lechmere did not address whether its analysis applied to nonorganizational union 
activity such as area standards, recognition, or publicity picketing—conduct, unlike 
1154, 1155 (1990) (concluding that subcontractor’s employee could not be barred from principal 
employer’s property), enforced, 954 F.2d 700, 705 & n.5 (11th Cir. 1992).  But see New York New York, 
LLC v. NLRB, 313 F.3d 585, 589 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (questioning continued viability of Southern Services
after Lechmere’s “express reaffirmation of the employee/nonemployee distinction”). New York New York
stated that distinction works because Section 7 provides employees with a limited property right to engage 
in organizational activity on their employer’s property.  313 F.3d at 589.  That right to organize means that 
employees are not trespassers; nonemployees, however, lack that right and are considered trespassers.  Id.
This begs the question, however, of why Section 7 provides employees, but not nonemployees, that right.  
See infra notes 58-66 and accompanying text.
56 The Court, in a different context, has distinguished employees and nonemployees based on the argument 
that only nonemployees trespass. See Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 571 (1978). But, as then-
Justice Rehnquist noted in dissent, the Republic Aviation employees could be considered trespassers if they 
violated the employer’s conditions for entry.  Id. at 581-82 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting ); see also New York, 
New York, 313 F.3d at 589 (noting that employee could be trespasser because “‘conditional or restricted 
consent to enter land creates a privilege to do so only in so far as the condition or restriction is complied 
with”) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 168); First Healthcare Corp., 336 N.L.R.B. 646, 649 
(2001) (“[A]ny employee engaged in activity to which the employer objects on its property, might be 
deemed a trespasser, not an invitee:  the employer arguably is free to define the terms of its invitation to 
employees.”), enforced, 344 F.3d 523 (6th Cir. 2003); Gresham, supra note 23, at 165 (stating that both 
employee and nonemployee conduct can be “trespassory; the important question is whether both or neither” 
should be privileged by NLRA).
57 See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text; ITT Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 413 F.3d 64, 72-73 (D.C. Cir. 
2005) (enforcing Board’s conclusion that off-duty employee activity is covered by Republic Aviation 
because off-duty employees have “nonderivative” access rights).  Another possible explanation is 
employees’ economic dependency on their employer; thus, limits on employee discussions at the workplace 
more seriously threaten labor rights than limits on nonemployee activity.  Cf. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 
395 U.S. 575, 617 (1969) (holding, with regard to employer threats, that Board must consider “the 
economic dependence of the employees on their employers, and the necessary tendency of the former . . . to 
pick up intended implications of the latter that might be more readily dismissed by a more disinterested 
ear.”).  The Board’s failure to regularly examine the effect of employers’ exclusionary activity on employee 
rights suggests that this concern does not underlie the current analysis.
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organizing, in which unions have a direct right to engage.58  The Board ultimately 
concluded that Lechmere applied to virtually all nonemployee activity, even conduct that 
is directly protected.59 According to the Board, the choice between the Lechmere or
Republic Aviation analyses is based solely on whether employees or nonemployees were 
being excluded, no matter whether they were exercising a direct or derivative right.60
This conclusion rested on the Board’s view that, given Lechmere’s refusal to protect 
nonemployee organizers, it would be odd to require greater access for nonemployees 
engaged in less- respected nonorganizational activity.61 Thus, under the Board’s analysis, 
58 See Great Am., 322 N.L.R.B. 17, 18 & n.5 (1996) (consumer boycott and area standards picketing,—
which attempts to convince employer to raise wages and work conditions to union norm for area); Leslie 
Homes, Inc., 316 N.L.R.B. 123, 125, 127 (1995) (area standards handbilling); Bristol Farms, Inc., 311 
N.L.R.B. 437, 438 n.8 (1993) (publicity picketing—which informs public about union’s dispute with 
employer) (citing NLRB v. Teamsters Local 639 (Curtis Bros.), 362 U.S. 274, 281-282 (1960) 
(recognitional picketing—which attempts to convince employer to recognize union as employees’ 
representative without Board election)); Robert A. Gorman, Union Access to Private Property, 9 HOFSTRA 
LAB L.J. 1, 22-23 (1992) (suggesting that Lechmere was not applicable to union appeals to customers). 
59 See O’Neil’s Mkts. v. UFCW, 95 F.3d 733, 737 (8th Cir. 1996); Leslie Homes, 316 N.L.R.B. at 125, 127.
The construction industry often presents a special case.  The use of subcontractors may limit a private 
property owner’s ability to restrict union access more than usual—for example, where a union 
representative is trying to contact members who are working for a subcontractor at the site.  See Wolgast 
Corp. v. NLRB, 2003 WL 22146137, at *6 (6th Cir. Sept. 16, 2003) (Table); see also Roger D. Hughes 
Drywall, 344 N.L.R.B. No. 49, at 17 (2005) (stating that coercive employer conduct against unions 
interferes with rights of unrepresented employees, “even if those individual’s interest are not congruent 
with, and even may be antithetical to, the interest of the [represented employees]”) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).
60
 Metro. Dist. Council v. NLRB, 68 F.3d 61, 75 (3d Cir. 1995); Leslie Homes, 316 N.L.R.B. at 129; see 
UFCW v. NLRB (Oakland Mall II and Loehmann’s Plaza II), 74 F.3d 292, 298-99 (D.C. Cir. 1996) 
(explicitly rejecting derivative versus direct rights distinction); Estlund, supra note 7, at 323-25, 350-52 
(arguing that Republic Aviation should apply to union conduct directly protected by Act).
61 Leslie Homes, 316 N.L.R.B. at 129 (stating that Sears, 436 U.S. at 206 & n.42, suggests that 
nonemployee area standards picketing is less favored than nonemployee organizational activity).  The D.C. 
Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Edwards, agreed with this analysis.  See UFCW, 74 F.3d at 293-94 
(holding, in consumer boycott and area standards picketing cases, that “[u]nder established caselaw, it 
would make no sense to hold that nonemployees have a greater right of access when attempting to 
communicate with an employer’s customers than when attempting to communicate with an employer’s 
employees.”). UFCW reflects a hierarchy under which nonemployees’ interest in communicating with 
customers is considered weaker than the nonemployees’ interest in communicating with employees.  Id. at 
298 & n.5.  Indeed, some courts have expressed doubt whether Babcock’s discrimination exception applies 
to nonemployees engaged in nonorganizational activity.  See Central Hardware Co. v. NLRB, 407 U.S. 
539, 545 (1972) (stating that “the principle of accommodation announced in Babcock is limited to labor 
organization campaigns”); Be-Lo Stores v. NLRB, 126 F.3d 268, 284 (4th Cir. 1987) (citing UFCW, 74 
F.3d at 300; Cleveland Real Estate Partners v. NLRB, 95 F.3d 457, 465 (6th Cir.1996)).  But see Stephanie 
Goss John, Oakland Mall, Ltd.:  A Further Limitation of Union Access to Private Property, 57 La. L. Rev. 
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nearly all protected employee activity is shielded from employer interference pursuant to
Republic Aviation.62 Nonemployee conduct, whether directly or derivatively protected, is 
subject to employer interference under the Lechmere scheme.
By refusing to focus on derivate versus direct rights, the Board has put itself in a 
logical bind.  The Board has felt constrained by the Court’ s statement that directly
protected nonemployee conduct such as publicity picketing is given less weight than 
nonemployee organizational activity.63 A derivative/direct analysis would therefore give
the “weaker” nonorganizational conduct, although a direct right, more protection against 
employer property interests than derivative, organizational activity.64  Rather than
questioning the efficacy of this hierarchy rationale,65 the Board has embraced a circular
logic under which nonemployee organizational activity has little protection because it is a 
derivative right, but directly protected nonemployee conduct also lacks protection
because the hierarchy places it below organizational activity.  There may be good reasons
for this employee/nonemployee analysis,66 but the Board has yet to express any.
This failure is all the more frustrating because the employee/nonemployee 
distinction is increasingly problematic in the modern workforce.  The growing use of 
361, 375 (1996) (criticizing extension of Lechmere to non-organizational activity); Zmija, supra note 55, at 
127-28 (same).
62 See infra note 67 (discussing off-duty employees).
63 Sears, 436 U.S. at 206 & n.42.
64 See supra note 61.
65
 The hierarchy theory does not fit well with Lechmere.  If Lechmere was based upon a hierarchy of rights,
Jean Country’s balancing test—which expressly considered the strength of the Section 7 interests at 
stake—should have been appropriate.  Instead, Lechmere held that no balancing was required because the 
union’s derivative rights were satisfied as long as reasonable alternatives exist.  See supra note 52.  
Moreover, although organizing activity is obviously a primary concern of the NLRA, the basis provided for 
the hierarchy distinction—that area standards, recognitional, and publicity activity were recognized later 
than organizational activity—makes little sense.  The date a right was recognized under the Act should not 
govern the respective strength of that right.
66 See Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 521 n.10 (1976) (distinguishing nonemployee organizing from 
Republic Aviation employee activity because under former, “employer’s management interests rather than 
his property interests were . . . involved.  This difference is ‘one of substance.’”) (quoting Babcock, 351 
U.S. at 113).
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contractors, telecommuters, and other novel work relationships blurs the distinction 
between employees and nonemployees, particularly where access to property is at issue.67
Yet, no matter its justification, the employee/nonemployee distinction is undeniably the 
basis for post-Lechmere right-to-access cases.  The distinction’s significance is critical
because it suggests that the Board’s primary consideration in right-to-access cases should 
be determining whether excluded organizers68 are employees, not the extent of the
employer’s property interests under state law.  The Board’s current analysis, however,
has proved otherwise.
B. The Board’ s Current Analysis
The Board’s struggle to apply Lechmere has led to a right-to-access analysis that
makes little sense doctrinally or practically.  The Board’s approach generally consists of a 
single inquiry:  did the employer possess a state private property right that entitled it to 
exclude the nonemployee organizers?  For most cases, if the employer possessed such a 
right, no violation of the NLRA occurred.  If the employer lacked that right, then it 
automatically violated Section 8(a)(1).
67
 For example, although a telecommuter may clearly be an employee, should she receive the same right to 
access a worksite as nontelecommuters?  Also, should a contractor who works alongside other employees 
at a site be given the same access rights?  See New York New York, 313 F.3d at 585 (holding that issue is 
uncertain because “[n]o Supreme Court case decides whether a contractor’s employees have rights 
equivalent to the property owner’s employees . . . because their worksite, although on the premises of 
another employer, is their sole place of employment”).  Off-duty employees are another source of 
confusion.  Currently, an employer is able to restrict off-duty employees’ access only with respect to the 
inside of a facility or other working areas, where the restriction is clearly disseminated to employees, it 
applies to all activities, and it is justified by valid business reasons.  See Teletech Holdings, Inc., 333 
N.L.R.B. No. 56, at 4 (2001); Tri-County Med. Ctr., 222 N.L.R.B. 1089, 1090 (1976).  In contrast to 
nonemployee organizers, the Board considers off-duty employees, even those who do not work at the site 
in question, to have a nonderivative right to access the property.  See First Healthcare Corp., 336 N.L.R.B. 
646, 648 (2001), enforced, 344 F.3d 523 (6th Cir. 2003); accord ITT Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 413 F.3d 64, 
72-73 (D.C. Cir. 2005).  However, an employer’s property concerns will be given more weight where the 
off-duty employee works at a different site.  First Healthcare, 336 N.L.R.B. at 650.
68
  This Article will generally refer to excluded activity as organizational.  Although other nonemployee 
conduct may be involved and similarly analyzed, organizational activity is more common.  See supra notes 
58-67 and accompanying text.
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It makes little sense to require the Board—and reviewing federal courts of 
appeal—to rest their decision on an often complicated area of state law.  The Board’s 
expertise does not encompass state property issues and its treatment of those issues bears 
out that reality.  The resulting delay, and frequently inadequate analysis, harms not only 
the labor interests at stake, but state property interests as well. Even beyond these 
practical concerns, the current analysis appears wrong as a matter of law.  Although
ostensibly derived from Lechmere, the scheme runs counter to the analytical 
underpinnings of that decision.  The proposal here attempts to reconcile the right-to-
access inquiry with Lechmere, while also mitigating these practical concerns.
The Board’s response to Lechmere has been to create a strict dichotomy.  Where 
nonemployee organizers are engaged in activity on property that the employer controls, 
Lechmere applies.  In those circumstances, virtually any attempt by the employer to 
remove the organizers will be lawful, as long as reasonable alternatives to reach 
employees exist and the employer does not discriminatorily enforce its no-solicitation 
policy.  The initial question for the Board, therefore, is whether state law provides the 
employer the right to remove the organizers from the property at issue.
The importance of this state law issue is heightened by the other side of the 
dichotomy.  If the organizers are on property over which the employer lacks a right-to-
exclude—a situation that Lechmere did not address—the Board has determined that the 
Lechmere analysis does not apply.69  Thus, virtually any attempt by the employer to 
remove organizers from such property will automatically be unlawful.70
69
 NLRB v. Calkins, 187 F.3d 1080, 1088 (9th Cir. 1999).  However, even where the employer fails to 
show that it possesses a right-to-exclude, there are instances where the removal of nonemployee organizers 
does not violate the NLRA—for example, where the organizers are blocking access to the employer’s retail 
store or causing traffic problems.  See In re CSX Hotels, Inc., 340 N.L.R.B., No. 92, 2 (2003) (justifying 
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The significance of this analysis is its requirement that the Board address state 
property law in every case.  That determination, moreover, is almost always dispositive.71
The Board’s interpretation of a lease, its construction of a state’s treatment of public 
rights-of-way, or its factual determination of where the organizers were standing will 
either trigger Lechmere and make the employer’s attempt to exclude lawful, or evade
Lechmere and make the exact same attempt unlawful. This analysis is frustrating for the 
parties, as they cannot reasonably predict, ex ante, the Board’s determination of the state 
law issue.
In addition to the practical concerns raised by the Board’s reliance on state law, 
its current dichotomy makes little sense under Lechmere. The problem does not lie with 
Lechmere’s holding that employers need not permit access as long as reasonable 
alternative means to communicate with employees exist.  Rather, the difficulty arises 
with the Board’s categorical refusal to acknowledge the logic of this holding—if the 
existence of reasonable alternatives satisfies nonemployee organizers’ derivate right to 
contact employees, then that right is satisfied no matter where organizing activity is 
located when the employer tries to stop it.  The derivative right analysis should be the 
same whether the organizers are standing on property that the employer controls or on 
property, such as the public grassy strip in Lechmere, over which the employer lacks 
exclusion based on traffic problems); Great Am., 322 N.L.R.B. 17, 20-21 (1996) (justifying exclusion 
based on traffic blockage and impeding customers’ entry and exit).
70 See, e.g., Calkins, 187 F.3d at 1088 (“Where state law does not create [an interest allowing the employer 
to exclude organizers], access may not be restricted consistent with Section 8(a)(1).”).
71 See O’Neil’s Mkts. v. UFCW, 95 F.3d 733, 738-39 (8th Cir. 1996) (stating that “Lechmere leaves 
undisturbed previous Board holdings that an employer lacking the right to exclude others from certain 
property violates Section 8(a)(1) when it removes section 7 actors from those areas”) (citing Johnson & 
Hardin Co., 305 N.L.R.B. 690 (1991), enforced, 49 F.3d 237 (6th Cir. 1995)); Bristol Farms, Inc., 311 
N.L.R.B. 437, 437-38 (1993) (concluding that it is “beyond question” that, under Lechmere, an employer’s 
exclusion of organizers from public or private property over which it lacks state right- to-exclude violates 
Section 8(a)(1)).
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control.  Simply put, if reasonable alternatives exist that satisfy the organizers’ derivative 
right, no employer attempt to exclude them can infringe that right under Lechmere.
The Board’s continued insistence that employers automatically violate Section 
8(a)(1) by excluding organizers from property over which they lack a right-to-exclude
under state law72 purports to respect both state property law and labor law.  In practice, 
however, neither interest is served.
To be sure, property rights were a major concern of Lechmere.  Yet, if one takes 
seriously the Court’s statement that “[Section] 7 simply does not protect nonemployee 
union organizers except in the rare case where” reasonable alternatives are unavailable,73
the Board’s analysis is incorrect.  Where Section 7 does not protect union organizing, any 
employer interference with that activity is, by itself, lawful —no matter its location.
This Article concedes that holding74 and argues that the Board, instead of looking 
to state property law, should focus on the whether the manner in which an employer
excludes organizing activity interfered with employees’ right to freely choose whether to
72 See supra note 71.  The analysis reflects the Board’s view that Lechmere is applicable only where there is 
a conflict between employer property interests and labor rights.  See Indio Grocery Outlet, 323 N.L.R.B. 
1138, 1141 (1997), enforced, 187 F.3d 1080 (9th Cir. 1999).  As shown, however, Lechmere limited the 
scope of union’s derivate right—and, therefore, an employer’s ability to interfere with that right—even 
where employer property interests are not present.
73 Lechmere, 502 U.S. at 537.
74 This concession is not an endorsement.  Because Lechmere is likely to remain for the foreseeable future,
this Article accepts it as settled law; however, the decision, particularly its extraordinarily broad view of 
“reasonable alternatives,” has been widely criticized.  See id. at 542-44 (arguing that Babcock’s definition 
of reasonable efforts was not limited to remote logging camp situations) (White, J., dissenting); Estes & 
Porter, supra note 23, at 363-66 (criticizing holding that employee notice of organizational campaign 
satisfies derivative right); Estlund, supra note 7, at 332 (arguing that effective organizing requires worksite 
communication with employees); Zmija, supra note 55, at 113-16 (criticizing Lechmere’s reasonable-
alternatives test); Gorman, supra note 58, at 12 (stating that “the Babcock & Wilcox Court did not at all 
state that the [reasonable alternatives] standard was well-nigh impossible to satisfy, as the Court now 
portrays it in Lechmere”).  But see Comment, Michael L. Stevens, The Conflict Between Union Access and 
Private Property Rights:  Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB and the Question of Accommodation, 41 Emory L.J. 
1317, 1340-47 (1992) (arguing that Lechmere properly rejected Jean County’s balancing approach and 
reasonable-alternatives analysis).
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pursue collective representation.75 This proposal more accurately reflects Lechmere and 
avoids the myriad problems associated with the current practice of making an employer’s 
state property rights dispositive.  Indeed, the proposal would eliminate state law from the 
Board’s analysis of right-to-access cases.76 The Board’s past treatment of state property 
law shows that this change would significantly benefit the enforcement of federal labor 
rights, the administration of the Board and federal courts’ adjudicatory processes, and the
independence of state property law.
C. The Board’s  Difficulties with State Property Law
Although the Board’s task in applying Lechmere is not enviable,77 its designation 
of state property law as the dispositive issue makes little sense.  The Board’s expertise is 
solely in federal labor law and does not include the vagaries of over fifty different 
property regimes.  It is not surprising, therefore, that Board resolution of these cases is 
much slower than usual.78 The reason for this delay, as well as the possibility of federal 
interference with state property law, are well-illustrated by the following two cases.
75
 The Board, on occasion, has suggested that it would consider the effect on employees’ general Section 7 
rights, but its analyses ultimately fail to provide any consideration of non-derivative rights.  See, e.g., Home 
Depot, U.S.A., Inc., 317 N.L.R.B. 732, 733 (1995) (stating issue as “whether the rights of employees were 
affected by the actions taken by” employer, but finding no effect solely because employer possessed right 
to exclude organizer, did not deny employees access to union information, and did not discriminatory apply
no- solicitation rule). 
76 The proposal would not leave union organizers without recourse.  Rather, it would require the Board to 
look not to state property law, but to whether the employer’s attempt to remove the union infringed on 
employees’ labor rights.  See infra Section II.
77 See Estlund, supra note 7, at 341.
78
 The Board consistently takes substantially longer to decide Lechmere-related unfair labor practices cases 
than normal.  The median number of days from the filing of the charge to a Board decision in Lechmere
cases compared to all Board unfair labor practice cases (including Lechmere cases) over the most recently 
reported ten-year period is as follows:  Fiscal Year 2004 (865 median days for Lechmere cases; 690 median 
days for all cases); FY2003 (1132 Lechmere; 647 all); FY2002 (812 Lechmere (only one case); 889 all); 
FY2001 (1502 Lechmere; 1144 all); FY2000 (1351 Lechmere; 878 all); FY1999 (1128 Lechmere; 747 all); 
FY1998 (1212 Lechmere; 658 all); FY1997 (928 Lechmere; 557 all); FY1996 (943 Lechmere; 591 all); 
FY1995 (1725 Lechmere; 586 all); FY1994 (755 Lechmere; 503 all).  59-69 NLRB ANNUAL REPORTS 
(1995-2005).
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At issue in Snyder’s of Hanover v. NLRB,79 was the employer’s attempt to 
exclude union organizers from a public right-of-way located next to the entrance of its 
snack-food plant.  Before arriving at the plant, the organizers called the state department 
of transportation and local township—both of which confirmed that the organizers could 
distribute handbills from the right-of-way.80 Subsequently, as the organizers distributed
handbills to employees from the right-of-way, the employer demanded that the organizers
leave and, after they refused, called the police.81 The responding officer contacted an 
assistant district attorney, who stated that the organizers had a right to handbill in the 
right-of-way as long as they were peaceful and did not interfere with traffic.82
The union subsequently filed an unfair labor practice charge with the Board 
alleging that the employer violated Section 8(a)(1) by prohibiting organizers from 
handbilling on the right-of-way and by calling the police to remove them.83  At first 
blush, this appeared to be an easy case.  The organizers were told by government officials
that they could handbill in a public right-of-way.  Thus, the employer seemed to lack a 
property interest sufficient to invoke Lechmere which, under the Board’s current analysis,
meant that the attempt to stop the handbilling was unlawful.  What developed during 
litigation, however, reveals how state property law issues can be far more complex than 
they first appear—and why those issues are best left to state courts rather than a federal 
agency specializing in labor law.
79 334 N.L.R.B. 183 (2001), enforcement denied in relevant part, 39 Fed.Appx. 730 (3d Cir. 2002).
80 Id. at 185.
81
 39 Fed.Appx. at 731-32.
82 Id. at 732.
83
 334 N.L.R.B. at 183; see infra note 121 (discussing whether calling police still violates NLRA).  The 
union also charged the employer with unlawfully engaging in surveillance of employees receiving the 
handbills; the Third Circuit enforced the Board’s finding that the surveillance violated Section 8(a)(1).  See 
39 Fed.Appx. at 735-37; infra notes 166-175 and accompanying text (discussing surveillance).
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As the employer itself failed initially to realize, Pennsylvania’s treatment of the 
public’ s right to use a right-of-way is counter-intuitive.84 In Pennsylvania, a landowner 
owns to the middle of an abutting street, “subject only to an easement of public use.”85
The scope of that easement is defined entirely by the relevant municipality’s 
authorization of a given use by the public.86  Any use not expressly permitted by the 
municipality may be stopped by the landowner.87 In Snyder’s, the Board found that the 
employer’s attempt to stop the handbilling was unlawful because it failed to provide any 
evidence of such authorization and thereby failed to satisfy its burden to show that it 
possessed a right-to-exclude.88 The Third Circuit—via a panel including then-Judge 
Alito—disagreed, holding that the employer did not bear the burden of proving what the 
municipal code permitted, and that the court’s interpretation of the code showed no 
express authorization of union handbilling on public rights-of-way.89
The convoluted nature of this analysis illustrates the difficulties encountered by
the Board and courts when they have to examine state property law.  Indeed, the issue in 
Snyder’s was more complicated than either the Board or court acknowledged, as neither
addressed whether the permission to handbill given to the organizers by local and state 
officials constituted “authorization” under Pennsylvania law.90
84
 334 N.L.R.B. at 187 n.8 (noting that employer raised issue after hearing).
85 Id. at 183 n.4 (quoting City of Philadelphia v. Street, 63 Pa. D. & C.2d 709 (1974)).
86 Id.; accord 46 S. 52nd St. Corp. v. Manlin, 398 Pa. 304, 312, 157 A.2d 381, 386 (1960).
87
 39 Fed.Appx. at 733; see Westinghouse Elec. Corp v. United Elec., Radio & Machine Workers, 353 Pa. 
446, 455-56 (1946).
88
 334 N.L.R.B. at 184.
89
 39 Fed.Appx. at 734.
90
 334 N.L.R.B. at 184.
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Moreover, as the court noted, Pennsylvania’s expansive view of landowners’
control over public rights-of-way also raised constitutional concerns.91 Accurately noting 
that the Board did not address this constitutional issue,92 the court used this omission to 
justify its own avoidance of the issue.93  That holding, alone, aptly demonstrates  why 
state property law should not be resolved in federal labor cases.  A serious constitutional 
right was at stake—whether a municipality can allow a landowner to stop expressive 
activity in a public right-of-way—yet the Board was unable, and the court unwilling, to 
address the issue.  The court’s decision, in particular, was troubling, for it willingly 
approved interference with organizers’ expressive activity pursuant to a rule about which 
it had obvious constitutional misgivings.  Eliminating state property law from the Board’s 
analysis would produce a far better outcome.  Under the proposal here,94 the Board would 
have examined only whether the employer’s actions chilled employees’ labor rights; any 
attempt to invoke or challenge Pennsylvania’s public rights-of-way rule would be 
determined by a state court that presumably would not be hesitant to entertain the 
constitutional issue.
A further issue in Snyder’s illustrates another complication in tackling state 
property law.  Although the employer was named “Snyder’s of Hanover” and stated 
91
 39 Fed.Appx. 733-34 (noting question whether municipality could prohibit leafleting in public right-of-
way given that leafleting may be constitutionally protected) (citing Manlin, 398 Pa. at 313; Edward J. 
DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 484 U.S. 568, 575-76 (1988)).
92
 What the court failed to recognize was that the Board could not address the issue, as it lacks the power to 
declare laws unconstitutional.  See Tressler Lutheran Home for Children v. NLRB, 677 F.2d 302, 304 (3d 
Cir. 1982) (“We agree with the Board that it has no authority to rule on constitutional questions . . . .”) 
(citing Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 109 (1977)); see also Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 368 
(1974).
93
 39 Fed.Appx. at 734.  The court was not warranted in avoiding an issue that the Board could not address.  
See Overstreet v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, 409 F.3d 1199, 1209 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that “because 
constitutional decisions are not the province of the NLRB . . . the tasks of evaluating the constitutional 
pitfalls of potential interpretations of the Act and of interpreting the Act to avoid those dangers are 
committed de novo to the courts”).
94 See infra Part II.
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throughout litigation that its plant was in Hanover Township, it argued for the first time 
in its reply brief to the court that its plant was actually in Penn Township.95  The almost 
comical nature of this issue should not obscure the serious concern that it raises.  If the 
dispositive property boundaries in a case are so confusing that the landowner itself is 
perplexed, we cannot expect an agency that specializes in federal labor law to accurately
and efficiently resolve the matter.  Enforcement of the NLRA and Pennsylvania property 
law would have been far better had a Pennsylvania court, not the Board, delved into these 
complicated state law issues.96
The extraordinarily limited ability to use a public right-of-way in Pennsylvania 
sharply contrasts with the broad right to access certain private property in California.  In 
particular, California’s prohibition against landowners barring uninvited expressive 
activity on private property that is generally open to the public provides further support 
for the elimination of state law questions from federal labor cases.  This rule was 
implicated in Waremart Foods,97 where to an even greater degree than Snyder’s, the 
Board’s current analysis led to a significant federal intrusion into state property law.
At issue in Waremart was whether California provided an employer the right to 
exclude union handbilling in front of its supermarket.  Organizers, standing in the 
employer’s parking lot, distributed handbills to customers urging them to boycott the 
store.98  The employer responded by asking the organizers to leave and calling the 
95 Compare Petitioner’s Rely Brief, 2001 WL 34545824, at *n.2 (Dec. 19, 2001), with Petitioner’s Opening 
Brief, 2001 WL 34401696 (Sept. 18, 2001).  The court took judicial notice of the fact that the facility was 
in Penn Township.  39 Fed.Appx. at 733.
96 Id. at 734 n.1 (stating that Board possessed “specialty in labor law only . . . [but] issues of labor law are 
intricately tied to issues of state law . . . [and] the Board routinely plies its hand at interpreting state law, an 
area of law in which it has no expertise,” yet holding that, unlike foreign law, Board should not require 
parties to prove state law as issue of fact).
97
 337 N.L.R.B. 289 (2001), enforcement denied, 354 F.3d 870 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (Waremart II).
98
 354 F.3d at 871.
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police.99  Acting on the union’s subsequent Section 8(a)(1) charge, the Board found that 
the employer’s conduct was unlawful because it lacked a right-to-exclude under 
California property law.100 That finding was based upon state court decisions holding 
that landowners could not unreasonably bar expressive activity on privately-owned 
shopping areas.101
The D.C. Circuit’s initial review of the Board’s decision noted that these cases 
were based on either a California statute, the California Constitution, or the federal
Constitution.102  The problem, according to the court, was that an intervening U.S. 
Supreme Court decision had undermined the federal constitutional rationale, and that 
subsequent California appellate courts had cast doubt on whether state law protected 
expressive activity on property near private, stand-alone stores.103  The court, therefore,
certified to the California Supreme Court two questions:  whether California law 
permitted the employer to prevent expressive activity on its parking lot and walkways;
and, if the employer generally possessed that right, whether California law carved out an 
99 Id.
100
 337 N.L.R.B. at 289 (citing Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego District Council of Carpenters, 25 
Cal.3d 317 (1979) (Sears II)).  See infra notes 191-208 and accompanying text for discussion of the case 
prior to remand.
101
 354 F.3d at 872-73 (citing Sears II, 599 P.2d at 682) (holding that California’s “Moscone Act,” Cal. Civ. 
Proc. Code § 527.3, precluded injunctions against peaceful picketing on privately owned sidewalks);
Robins v. PruneYard Shopping Ctr., 592 P.2d 341, 347 (1979) (holding that California Constitution 
protected speech in private shopping centers), affirmed, 447 U.S. 74, 83-84 (1980); In re Lane, 475 P.2d 
561, 565 (1969) (holding that union handbilling at stand-alone grocery store protected by federal First 
Amendment), abrogated in relevant part by Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 518-21 (1976); Schwartz-
Torrance Inv. Corp v. Bakery & Confectionery Workers’ Union, 61 Cal. 2d 766 (1964) (suggesting state 
law rationale)). 
102
 Waremart Foods v. NLRB, 333 F.3d 223, 225-27 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (Waremart I).
103 Id. at 226 n.2, 227 (citing Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 518-21 (1976); Albertson’s, Inc. v. Young, 
107 Cal. App.4th 106 (2003) (distinguishing Robins because private supermarket not like traditional public 
forum); Young v. Raley’s, Inc., 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d 172, 179-82 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (same); Waremart, Inc. 
v. Progressive Campaigns, Inc., 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d 392 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (same); Trader Joe’s v. 
Progressive Campaigns, Inc., 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d 442, 448-49 (1999) (same)); see also Golden Gateway Ctr. v. 
Golden Gateway Tenants Ass’n, 29 P.3d 797, 809 & n.11 (Cal. 2001) (holding that Lane and Schwartz-
Torrance based on federal, not California, Constitution)).  Young and Progressive Campaigns were 
“depublished” by the California Supreme Court’s initial grant, then dismissal, of review.  See Waremart II, 
354 F.3d at 874 n.3.
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exemption allowing union expressive activity related to a labor dispute with the 
landowner.104
Given California’s own confusion, the D.C. Circuit’s desire for clarification was 
understandable, but ultimately fruitless.  The California Supreme Court refused to accept 
the certification, thereby forcing the federal court to makes its own determination of state
property law.105  The court concluded that the primary Californ ia Supreme Court decision 
cited by the Board relied on a state anti- labor injunction statute, rather than the state 
constitution’s protection of expressive activity.106 Because two U.S. Supreme Court 
decisions had since ruled that special exemptions for labor picketing violated the First 
Amendment, the D.C. Circuit concluded that this state decision “cannot reflect current 
California law.”107 Thus, according to the D.C. Circuit, California no longer gave special 
protection to expressive activity occurring on property owned by the targeted employer.
The court then rejected the Board’s argument that California generally limited a 
landowner’s right to restrict expressive activity on its property.  According to the court, 
the California Supreme Court decision supporting that argument was based on a federal 
constitutional interpretation that the U.S. Supreme Court later abandoned.108 Particularly 
interesting was the D.C. Circuit’s reliance on two California appellate courts that came  to 
the same conclusion,109 despite a Ninth Circuit decision to the contrary.110
104 Waremart I, 333 F.3d at 227-28 (questioning whether Sears II plurality established general right to 
expressive activity or special rule for labor activity).
105 Waremart II, 354 F.3d at 871.
106 Id. at 874 (holding that Sears II relied on Moscone Act).
107 Id. at 875 (holding that “[w]e believe that if the meaning of the Moscone Act came before the California 
Supreme Court again, it would either hold the statute unconstitutional or construe it to avoid 
unconstitutionality”) (citing Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980); Police Dep’t of City of Chicago v. 
Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972)).
108 Id. at 875 (citing In re Lane, 475 P.2d at 565; Hudgens, 424 U.S. at 518-21).
109 Id. (citing Albertson’s, 131 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 735, and Trader Joe’s, 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 450).
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Regardless of one’s view of the substance of the D.C. Circuit’s interpretation of 
California law, the analysis itself is disturbing.  Waremart involved an initial construction
of state law by a federal agency with expertise solely in labor law.  That interpretation
was reversed by a federal court that overruled a state supreme court decision based in 
large part on the holdings of two state appellate courts—even though the federal appeals 
court that hears most California federal cases ruled the other way.111  It is hard to imagine 
a worse method to analyze state property law, yet this process is essentially required by 
the Board’s current right-to-access scheme.112 Most seriously, ambiguities in state law 
are being resolved by federal agencies and courts, rather than state courts. Thus, the 
Board’s reliance on state law causes not only delay and unnecessary variance in the 
enforcement of federal labor rights, but also inexpert federal interference with state law.
The proposal here would drastically improve this situation by having the Board 
and federal courts look solely to federal labor issues, while leaving state property 
questions to state courts.  There is little, if any, benefit from federal interpretation of state 
property law, particularly when originated by the Board.  Moreover, federal labor policy 
suffers when its enforcement varies depending on geography.  No labor policy is served 
by having an identical action considered lawful in some states, yet unlawful in others.  
110 Id. at 875-76 (citing NLRB v. Calkins, 187 F.3d 1080, 1089-93 (9th Cir. 1999)).  The D.C. Circuit also 
rejected the application of Robins because, unlike the shopping center there, the Waremart supermarket—a 
stand-alone store—could not constitute a traditional public forum.  See id. at 876.
111 Waremart also raises the threat that federal courts will limit state attempts to protect labor speech.  See
Aron Fischer, Comment, Is the Right To Organize Unconstitutional?, 113 Yale L. J. 1999, 2002 (2004) 
(“Taken at face value, the D.C. Circuit’s reasoning would seem to invalidate all state laws expanding the 
rights of nonemployee organizers.”); cf. Estlund, supra note 7, at 309 (arguing that, under Lechmere, 
NLRA cases may override state limits on landowners’ right-to-exclude) (citing Rum Creek Coal Sales, Inc. 
v. Caperton, 966 F.2d 353 (4th Cir. 1991)).
112 See supra note 9 (citing complicated state property law issues); see also Corporate Interiors, Inc., 340 
N.L.R.B. No. 85 (2003) (concluding that employer unlawfully removed union picketers from public 
easement near employer’s office, because agreement with city to maintain area did not include right-to-
exclude).
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The proposal removes that inconsistency, thereby strengthening both the enforcement of 
federal labor policy and the autonomy of state property law.
II. THE NEW PARADIGM:  HOW—NOT WHERE—THE EMPLOYER EXCLUDES
Under the Board’s right-to-access dichotomy, employer interference with 
nonemployee activity on property that the employer controls is almost always lawful.  If 
the activity is nontrespassory, virtually all employer interference is unlawful. The 
rationale of Lechmere, however, belies that fr amework. Under Lechmere, interference 
with organizing activity never violates nonemployees’ derivative rights unless the 
interference is discriminatory or eliminates all reasonable means to communica te with 
employees.113  Accordingly, the proposal deems nonemployees’ derivative rights satisfied 
wherever reasonable alternatives exist.
Although a substantial modification of the Board’s current analysis, the proposal
is consistent with both Lechmere and the Board’s reliance on the employee/nonemployee 
distinction.  It would also respect Lechmere’s intent to protect employers’ property 
interests where organizers have other means of achieving their goal.  Most important, it 
would eliminate the Board’s ineffective forays into state property law.  Instead, the Board 
would concentrate on the issue it should have been addressing all along—whether the 
manner in which an employer tried to stop nonemployee activity infringed employees’
rights under the Act.
113 See Waldbaum, Inc. v. United Farm Workers, 383 N.Y.S.2d 957, 975 (N.Y.Sup. 1976) (holding that 
union’s picketing targeting one employer in shopping mall had no reasonable, alternative location to area in 
front of employer’s store); supra Section I.B.; infra notes 177-190 and accompanying text.
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A. Presumptions of Interference
With few exceptions,114 the Board has not regularly examined whether the manner 
in which an employer attempts to exclude nonemployee activity would tend to chill 
employee rights.  This omission is curious, as it is easy to imagine that an employer’s 
exclusion of organizers would often hinder employees’ willingness to seek collective 
representation.  Indeed, a major shortcoming of Lechmere is its failure to acknowledge 
that virtually all exclusions negatively impact employees’ Section 7 rights in some 
fashion.115 However, recognizing Lechmere as controlling law, the proposal accepts its
disregard of the derivate infringement of employee rights caused by an employer’s 
elimination of an important source of information about collective representation.  Yet, 
the proposal attempts to address the possible direct impact on Section 7 rights left 
untouched by Lechmere—where the employer’s exclusion interferes with employees’ 
willingness to pursue unionization.
Section 8(a)(1) prohibits any action by the employer that tends to coerce, restrain, 
or interfere with employees’ Section 7 right of self-organization.116 The central question 
for such a violation is whether the employer’s conduct tends to be coercive; the existence 
of animus or actual coercion is irrelevant.117 Given the lack of a good-faith defense, as 
well as employees’ economic dependence on their employer, it is safe to assume that 
114 See infra note 155.
115 See Estlund, supra note 7, at 330-33.
116 See supra note 15.
117
 The Supreme Court has long held that “[a] violation of [Section] 8(a)(1) alone . . . presupposes an act 
which is unlawful even absent a discriminatory motive.” Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Darlington 
Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263, 269 (1965); accord Retlaw Broad. Co. v. NLRB, 53 F.2d 1002, 1006 (9th Cir. 
1995) (holding that “[a]nti-union motive is not required” under Section 8(a)(1)).
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certain attempts to bar organizing activity would tend to make an employee reasonably 
believe that a decision to unionize would be met with harsh consequences .118
The question, then, is what type of exclusionary conduct would tend to interfere 
with employees’ rights?  The Board addresses this kind of issue regularly and is well-
equipped to do so in right-to-access cases.  Although the Board could use a case-by- case 
analysis, it seems far better to provide the parties, especially employers, with clear 
guidelines.119  Employers would no longer face the unenviable choice of either allowing 
what may be a trespass on its property or attempting to protect its perceived property 
interest by risking a violation of the NLRA.  Thus, instead of a case-specific analysis, the 
proposal would create a set of presumptions to guide employer and union conduct.120
First, the Board should deem as presumptively lawful any action by the employer
that does not go beyond simply and peacefully requesting nonemployees to stop 
organizing on property that, from the employees’ perspective, is clearly or questionably 
under the employer’s control.  Asking law enforcement to remove the organizers will 
typically constitute such a request.121
118 See supra note 57.
119 See Zmija, supra note 55, at 117-18 (describing costs of ambiguity under Babcock).  Indeed, things have 
not improved much since Professor Gould, writing before he became NLRB Chairman, emphasized that 
parties needed deliverance from the “morass” of no-solicitation rulings and that, “[m]ore than anything 
else, the law must have clarity and a practical appreciation for the parties’ needs.” Gould, Question, supra
note 28, at 146.
120
 The Board frequently uses such presumptions, which courts have readily accepted.  Indeed, an excellent 
example is employee solicitations on employer property.  See supra note 17.
121 Although calling the police to remove organizers could easily chill employee rights, recent Supreme 
Court decisions have limited the Board’s ability to regulate employers’ First Amendment right to redress 
the government.  See Bill Johnson’s Rests., Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 744- 45 (1983) (holding that Board 
could enjoin state lawsuit only if it lacked a reasonable factual or legal basis); see also BE&K Constr. Co. 
v. NLRB, 536 U.S. 516, 536-37 (2002) (clarifying standard).  These cases may also restrict the Board’s 
ability to find an unfair labor practice based on a call to the police.  Indeed, despite suggestions by the 
Board that calling the police is not covered by Bill Johnson’s, the Board’s General Counsel has begun 
treating such calls as protected by the First Amendment. Compare Corporate Interiors, Inc., 340 N.L.R.B. 
No. 85, 2003 WL 22295366, at *25-*26 (2003) (finding unfair labor practice for calling police to remove 
union from public easement), and In re Wild Oats Mkts., Inc., 336 N.L.R.B. 139, 182 (2001) (stating that, 
if employer “had called the police to request [the union’s] removal, the Board would have found [it] in 
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The rationale for this presumption is that Board should not police the parties’ 
conduct as long as the dispute remains simply a question of control and use of the 
property.122 Organizers, however, could justify Board action by rebutting the 
presumption—showing, for example, that employees would view a nominally peaceful 
request as coercive or threatening because of a recent pattern of unlawful employer 
resistance to unionism.123 Similarly, an employer could answer that unio n violence, or
interference with business, justified a stronger response.124
The other side of this presumption is that any actions by the employer that goes
beyond a peaceful request would be viewed as coercive. Conduct such as threats, 
harassment, and violence can be assumed to inform employees that the employer’s 
concern extends beyond its property interests and that attempts to unionize will result in 
harmful consequences.125  The employer could rebut this presumption by showing that 
extra measures were needed to respond, for example, to organizers who refused to stop 
violation of Section 8(a)(1)”), with NLRB Advice Memorandum, United States Postal Service, Case 30-
CA-15830(P) (March 24, 2003) (stating that calling police is covered by Bill Johnson’s).  Therefore, the 
proposal will treat a call to the police as presumptively lawful unless it is without basis.  Cf. Johnson & 
Hardin Co. v. NLRB, 49 F.3d 237, 242-43 (6th Cir. 1995) (filing of criminal trespass charges against union 
lawful because of genuine issue of material fact on merits of trespass suit); Radcliffe v. Rainbow Constr.
Co., 254 F.3d 772, 785 (9th Cir. 2001) (permitting state tort claims for false imprisonment, false arrest, and 
malicious prosecution based on calls to police).  This issue, however, is unlikely to be resolved soon, as it 
raises significant questions about the Board’s ability to enforce the Act and the treatment of First 
Amendment conduct in different contexts.  Compare Bill Johnson’s, 536 U.S. at 536-37 (permitting lawsuit 
against union unless it lacks reasonable factual or legal basis), with Roger D. Hughes Drywall, 344 
N.L.R.B. No. 49, at 3 n.4 (2005) (finding call to police to be unlawful because employer did not have 
“good faith, albeit erroneous, belief” that union misconduct had occurred).  Moreover, the Board’s 
treatment of this issue further indicates why its current right-to-access analysis does not work.  The Board 
has previously found calls to police to be lawful if the employer had control over the property and unlawful 
if it lacked control.  See Corporate Interiors, 2003 WL 22295366, at *25-*26.  Yet, whether subsequent 
litigation determines that the employer had a state right-to-exclude says little about the reasonableness of 
the employer’s call to the police.
122 See supra note 145.
123 See infra note 160.
124 See infra notes 147-149.
125 Indeed, the Board has found that such conduct can violate Section 8(a)(1) even if it was not witnessed 
by employees.  See Hughes Drywall, 344 N.L.R.B. No. 49, at 3 (citing, in case involving threats and 
physical attack on picketers, Corporate Interiors, 2003 WL 22295366, at *14-*16; Bristol Farms, 311 
NLRB 437 (1993)).
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blocking traffic or harassing customers.  Like its traditional Section 8(a)(1) interference 
analysis, the Board would resolve such questions by looking for hostile conduct by either 
party, discriminatory exclusions by the employer, and other relevant factors.
This scheme would apply no matter what the employer’s state property interests 
turn out to be.  If organizers are on a public right-of-way that is arguably under the 
employer’s control, the Board’s analysis would be the same, regardless of how a state 
court would ultimately resolve the trespass issue.  In short, the Board would remain 
focused solely on whether the employer behaved in a way that tended to infringe 
employees’ labor rights, and leave the state trespassory issue to state courts.  There is 
simply no reason for the Board to delve into complicated state law to determine whether 
the NLRA has been violated.
The location of the organizing is not totally irrelevant, however.  The presumption 
analysis would apply where organizing occurs on property over which the employer
clearly, or questionably, has a right-to-exclude.  Alternatively, if the organizing takes 
place on property that employees would clearly view as outside of the employer’s 
control—for instance, a public park near the worksite—any employer attempt to exclude 
would be presumptively unlawful.  In such instances, the employer’s conduct would 
likely send the message to employees that its aim is to interfere with union activity, not to 
protect its property interests.  Importantly, the determination whether the property is 
clearly not under employer’s control is based solely on reasonable employees’
viewpoints, not state property law.
This scheme covers the entire spectrum of employer control over property.
Employees’ belief that an employer clearly lacks control over property creates a 
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presumption against employer interference; conversely, where the employer clearly 
controls the property, the presumption favors the employer. In the remaining middle 
ground—where the employer’s control is less certain—the employer again enjoys a 
presumption of lawfulness for all peaceful attempts to stop organizing.  This middle 
ground may, depending on the circumstances, provide a benefit over current law for one 
of the parties.  For instance, there will be some peaceful employer interference on 
property in this middle ground that the proposal would deem presumptively lawful, but 
that the Board would currently regard as  unlawful if it ultimately found no right-to-
exclude under state law. Similarly, if the employer engaged in coercive interference on 
property that is later determined to be under its control, the proposal would treat the 
interference as presumptively unlawful, while the Board would currently find the same 
conduct to be lawful.
This difference is not as extreme as it may appear, for the Act has long proscribed 
even good-faith employer conduct that tends to infringe employees’ labor rights.126  The 
proposal merely seeks to correct the Board’s omission in not regularly looking at the 
issue.  Indeed, the Board has sporadically found that an employer’s exclusion of 
nonemployee organizers unlawfully chilled employee rights.127  The proposal merely 
regularizes that inquiry and, much like Republic Aviation, creates a presumption that 
126 See supra note 117.
127 See Marshall Field & Co., 98 NLRB 88, 104 (1952) (finding violation based on employer “forcibly”
removing organizers from public gathering in employees’ presence), enforced in relevant part, 200 F.2d 
375, 382 (7th Cir. 1952); Central Hardware Co., 181 N.L.R.B. 492, 492 (1970) (unlawful to expel, in 
employees’ presence, organizers who acted solely as store customers because expulsion motivated by 
“antiunion considerations”), enforcement denied in relevant part, 439 F.2d 1321 (8th Cir. 1971), vacated, 
407 U.S. 539 (1972); Heck’s, Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 760, 761 (1966).
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employer conduct extending beyond a peaceful request for nonemployees to stop 
organizing, or for government assistance, tends to interfere with employee rights.128
A major benefit of the proposal is that the Board would no longer have to 
examine state property law and would instead focus on what it does best—examining 
whether conduct tends to interfere with rights under the Act. The proposal’s superiority 
over the current analysis is illustrated by a hypothetical case where an employer 
peacefully asks union organizers to vacate a public easement over which employees 
generally believe the employer has a right-to-exclude. Even if state law ultimately 
reveals that the employer did not have a right-to-exclude, the employer’s request would 
not chill employee rights because employees would tend to view the employer’s conduct 
as a reasonable attempt to protect its property interest.  If the employer tried to stop the 
organizing through harassment and violence, however, employees would tend to feel that 
their rights were being threatened, even where the employer had a right-to-exclude.  The 
proposal takes these realities into account, in contrast to the current analysis, which 
would mechanically find that the employer violated the Act in the former instance and 
acted lawfully in the latter.
This improvement also exists where employees reasonably believe that organizers 
are on public property.  Even if that belief is incorrect,129 an employer’s exclusion of 
organizers from that area is likely to have a deleterious effect on employees’ freedom to 
choose collective representation. This analysis, moreover, creates little hardship for an 
128 Cf. Estlund, supra note 7, at 333 (“[A]n employer’s power to single out union organizers for 
exclusion . . . demonstrates the employer’s near-dictatorial power over the workplace, power it can use to 
keep the agents of unions, and perhaps unionization itself, at bay.”).
129 See supra notes 79-82 and accompanying text (describing organizers who were told by government 
officials that they could solicit on public right -of-way abutting employer’s plant, but state property law 
suggested that employer had right-to-exclude over right-of-way).
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employer, which has a great deal of control over employees’ perceptions of its property.  
Any employer that wants to protect it ability to peacefully exclude nonemployees from 
property it controls needs only to ensure that its employees are aware of that control.130
The benefit to the parties of ex ante clarity should not be underestimated.  Forcing 
parties to act based on guesses as to the future consequences of their actions may chill the 
exercise of legitimate labor and property rights.  Further, Board delay in resolving 
property disputes may prompt harmful self-help measures, particularly where time-
sensitive organizing is involved.131
The proposal recognizes that employer conduct beyond a peaceful request is 
likely to undermine the NLRA.  Allowing such activity weakens the Act’s ability to 
lessen labor strife and its resulting impact on commerce.132  Moreover, nonpeaceful 
employer exclusions directly threaten the Act’s fundamental protection of employees’
freedom to choose whether to seek collective representation.  The Board’s failure to 
regularly address these concerns ignores the full impact of nonpeaceful attempts to stop 
organizing activity—attempts that “cause[] employees to weigh the possibility of 
130
 Posting no-solicitation signs, or similar information, would presumably be sufficient.  Of course, an 
employer could take advantage of this rule by posting no -solicitation signs on property over which it lacks 
a right-to-exclude.  A union could counter such an attempt by using the property and informing employees 
that the signs are wrong.  Similarly, the Board could find that an employer violates the Act by knowingly 
misleading employees about its property rights.  To avoid the Board having to delve into property issues on 
even a peripheral matter, if such a violation were permitted it would have to be limited to the rare situations 
where the employer was able to deceive employees about an unambiguous property issue.
131
 One state justice has described the potentially violent risk of delay and self-help in right-to-access cases:
[A] possibility, of course, is for the employer to go out and hire some very large and very mean 
lads to persuade the picketers in the good old-fashioned way that they had made a mistake 
coming on private property.  Justice Powell referred to this as “self-help”, and labor lawyers 
sometimes refer to it as the “ungood” way of handling picketers.  In fact, nine out of ten labor 
lawyers of my acquaintance advise their business clients that beating up picketers with baseball 
bats, particularly when the Union reciprocates by dynamiting the employer’s premises, can 
create the mother of all labor disputes.
Riesbeck Food Mkts., Inc. v. UFCW, 185 W.Va. 12, 21 (1991) (Nelly, J., dissenting) (arguing against 
preemption of state trespass claims because of risks from Board delay).
132 See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (describing NLRA policies).
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incurring reprisals or other hostile employer reaction before under-taking to exercise their 
rights secured by the Act.”133  The proposal does not make the same omission.
1. What is Presumptively Lawful Conduct?
It is difficult to characterize precisely when an employer’s request for organizers
to leave is peaceful enough to trigger the Board’s presumption of lawfulness.  The Board 
would have significant leeway in establishing the boundaries for this presumption;
therefore, the following suggestions are merely a possible starting point for its analysis.
The employer’s request in Montgomery Ward & Co. v. NLRB is an archetype of 
presumptively lawful conduct.134  There, the employer attempted to remove union 
organizers who were meeting employees in the employer’s public cafeteria.135  Store 
managers told the organizers that they were trespassing and violating the store’s no-
solicitation policy, and said that if the organizers did not leave, they would call the 
police.136 The lawfulness of this conduct is complicated under the current scheme, as it 
requires the Board to determine whether, under state law, the employer had a right to 
exclude the organizers from property open to the public.137  The proposal’s analysis is far 
simpler.  No matter the ultimate determination of the employer’s state property rights, the
peaceful demand that the organizers leave would be presumptively lawful, particularly 
given the employer’s stated belief that the organizers’ violation of the no-solicitation 
policy constituted a trespass.  Under such circumstances, reasonable employees would 
not tend to view the request as chilling their freedom to pursue collective activity.  The 
133
 NLRB v. H.R. McBride, 274 F.2d 124, 127 (10th Cir. 1960) (holding that employer violated Section 
8(a)(1) by physically assaulting and verbally abusing pickets).
134
 692 F.2d 1115 (7th Cir. 1982) (Montgomery Ward II). 
135 Id. at 1117-18.
136 Id. at 1118-19.
137 Id. at 1124-28 (holding that no-solicitation policy was too broad and noting that trespass question 
depended on employer’s view of organizer’s activity in public cafeteria); see supra note 23.
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only remaining question for the Board would be a possible union rebuttal—for example, 
a challenge to the no-solicitation policy’s validity or, if valid, a claim that  the employer 
enforced the policy in a discriminatory manner.138
A union may rebut the presumption of lawfulness by pointing to circumstances 
showing that employees would reasonably tend to view the employer’s ostensibly 
innocuous conduct as threatening.  Common rebuttal factors would include evidence of 
the employer’s open union animus, contemporaneous unfair labor practices, the timing of 
the employer’s actions, and treating the union activity more harshly than other, similar 
conduct.139  An employer, for instance, may build a fence around its property which has 
the effect of preventing access by nonemployee organizers.  The fence, by itself, raises no 
labor law concerns and would be presumptively lawful.  The circumstances leading to the 
erection of the fence may belie that presumption, however.  If the fence suddenly 
appeared after a union organizing campaign began, the Board would be justified in 
finding interference with employees’ rights.140 Similarly, if employer comments
suggested that the fence was intended to keep out union organizers,141 it would impact 
employee rights in a manner that a fence intended to stop a rash of burglaries would not.
Although there are numerous other scenarios that would rebut a presumption of 
138 See Montgomery Ward II,  692 F.2d at 1122 (holding that employer discriminatorily enforced policy, 
which tended to “coerce[], restrain[], and interfere[] with the exercise of protected rights”).
139 See infra notes 160, 177-190 and accompanying text.
140 See, e.g., Four B Corp. v. NLRB, 163 F.3d 1177, 1183-84 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding that employer’s new 
no- solicitation policy—“hastily implemented in the face of the Union’s organizing effort”—was unlawful 
discrimination); NLRB v. Village IX, Inc., 723 F.2d 1360, 1366 (7th Cir. 1983) (holding that no-
distribution rule created in response to organizing campaign was unlawful); Mini-Togs, Inc., 304 N.L.R.B. 
649, 651 (1991) (concluding that, in response to organizing campaign, employer unlawfully prohibited 
nonemployees from handing out union literature from parking lot), enforcement granted in part and denied 
in part, 980 F.2d 1027 (5th Cir. 1993).  The remedy for such a violation may be limited, however, as it is 
not certain that the Board would, or could, order the fence taken down.
141
 The Section 8(a)(1) violation is still not dependent on the employer’s intent; rather, expressions of the 
employer’s motive are relevant only to the extent that they affect how a reasonable employee would tend to 
view the situation.  See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
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lawfulness, the underlying question always focuses on whether the employer’s seemingly 
unthreatening conduct would tend to interfere with employee rights.
This analysis promotes behavior by both organizers and employers that serve  the 
Act’s objective to promote industrial peace and protect employees’ freedom to choose 
whether or not to organize.142 Where employer attempts to stop organizing are done in a 
limited and peaceful fashion on property over which it has at least questionably has
control, the effect on union organizing and other labor rights is small or nonexistent.
Employees would view such conduct, absent countervailing circumstances, as an attempt 
to protect property interests rather than an attack on unionization. Moreover, organizers 
who believe they are on property out of the employer’s control can simply refuse to leave 
with the knowledge that more strident employer attempts to stop the organizing would 
presumptively violate the Act.143 Finally, as it can do currently, an employer may press
the property law issue—in response, for example, to organizers’ rejection of a peaceful 
request to leave—through a state trespass claim.144
These paths best promote the interests of the NLRA and state property law.  
Where the crux of a dispute is control of property, the state should resolve the issue; if the 
dispute centers on the infringement of employee rights, the NLRB is the best forum.  The 
Board’s current scheme, however, requires it to decide the state property law issue, even 
where the case ultimately fails to implicate federal labor policy.  In particular, under
Lechmere, federal labor rights are not at stake where an employer exercises its state 
property interests in a manner that does not tend to chill labor rights.  The Board should 
142 See supra note 132.
143 Employer attempts to remove organizers from property that is obviously out of its control will be 
unlawful.  See infra notes 121-126 and accompanying text.
144 See infra note 227.
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leave such disputes where they belong—in courts of the state from which the property 
rights originate.145
2. What is Presumptively Unlawful Conduct?
Presumptively unlawful activity is defined as any conduct that goes beyond a 
peaceful request for organizers to leave.146 Because that definition covers a broad range 
of circumstances, the following are merely examples of action s that the Board would 
deem presumptively unlawful under the proposal.  The examples are not exclusive; 
rather, they are intended to illustrate the type of employer conduct that represents a threat 
to employees’ labor rights.
An employer, of course, may rebut the presumption that its attempt to stop
organizing activity was unlawful.  Typical rebuttals include special characteristics of the 
property,147 organizing that causes safety problems148 or harms the employer’s 
business,149 and violence.150  Moreover, if employees view the property in question as
clearly under the employer’s control, organizers’ resistance to a peaceful and 
145
 This argument is consistent with the NLRA’s role in right-to-access cases.  As noted by the Ninth
Circuit, the Supreme Court has explained “that employers may exclude union organizers in deference to 
state common law, but not because the NLRA itself restricts access.  ‘The right of employers to exclude 
union organizers from their private property emanates from state common law, and while this right is not 
superceded by the NLRA, nothing in the NLRA expressly protects it.’”  NLRB v. Calkins, 187 F.3d 1080, 
1087-88 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200, 217 n.21 (1994)).  Like 
the Court, the proposal attempts to prevent NLRA interference with state property law.
146
 Repeated requests for the union to leave, especially where law enforcement has confirmed the union’s 
right to continue can be viewed as unlawful harassment.  Cf. In re CSX Hotels, Inc., 340 N.L.R.B., No. 92, 
2 (2003) (concluding that employer’s repeated requests that police remove union organizers showed that its 
concern was stopping union, not traffic problems), enforcement denied, 377 F.3d 394 (4th Cir. 2004).
147
  For example, increased limits on union activity may be appropriate if it disturbs hospital patients.  See 
Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483 (1978); NLRB v. S. Md. Hosp. Ctr., 916 F.2d 932, 935 (4th Cir. 
1990).
148 See supra note 146; CSX Hotels, 377 F.3d at 400-01 (holding that call to police was lawful because of 
traffic hazard); Great Am., 322 N.L.R.B. 17, 20-21 (1996) (justifying exclusion based, in part, on traffic 
blockage).
149 See Great Am., 322 N.L.R.B. at 20-21  (justifying exclusion based, in part, on interference with 
customers’ entry and exit); Estlund, supra note 7, at 334, 352 (citing conduct that interferes with customers, 
creates safety hazards, or undermines security).
150 See infra note 155.
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nondiscriminatory attempt to remove them may warrant some additional measures by the 
employer.151
A useful guide in assessing the type of conduct that would commonly trigger the 
presumption of unlawfulness is the Board’s decision in Corporate Interiors, Inc.152 The 
case involved a union campaign to organize workers by, among other things, picketing on 
a public easement in front of the employer’s office.153 The Board later determined that 
the employer, a construction contractor, lacked a right to exclude picketers from the
easement.154  That finding governed most of the Board’s analysis of whether the 
employer’s numerous attempts to stop the union organizing were lawful.  The wide range 
of employer conduct in Corporate Interiors—including threats, harassment, and 
surveillance—provides an excellent illustration of why, in right-to-access cases, the 
Board should regularly address possible interference with employees’ rights, instead of 
looking to state property law.
a. Threats
One of the most obvious forms of employer resistance to organizing activity is the 
use of threats.  Indeed, even currently, the Board typically recognizes that threats, 
particularly involving violence, are serious enough to infringe employees’ freedom to 
choose whether to unionize.155
151
 For example, otherwise unlawful surveillance might be justified in such a situation.  See infra notes 166-
175 and accompanying text.
152
 340 N.L.R.B. No. 85, 2003 WL 22295366 (2003).
153 Id. at *5, *24-*25 (noting employer’s arrangement with city to maintain easement area). 
154 Id. at *25.
155 Actual violence is plainly illegal as well.  See NLRB v. Village IX, Inc., 723 F.2d 1360, 1365 (7th Cir. 
1983) (assaulting union leafletter near employees); NLRB v. H.R. McBride, 274 F.2d 124, 126-27 (10th 
Cir. 1960) (physically assaulting and verbally abusing picketers); Batavia Nursing Inn, 275 N.L.R.B. 886, 
889 (1985) (punching union representative in front of employees as election ballots were to be counted); 
Kelco Roofing, 268 N.L.R.B. 456, 463 (1983) (repeatedly bumping union agent soliciting employees for 
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Corporate Interiors provides several examples of such threats.156 For instance, 
the Board, disagreeing with the administrative law judge, found that the employer 
violated Section 8(a)(1) because its threat to “blow [the picketer’s] head off” if he did not 
leave reasonably tended to “‘interfere with the free exercise of employee rights.’”157
Such extreme threats are not necessary to invoke the presumption of unlawfulness,
however.  Milder comments—like the Corporate Interiors official who, while talking to 
employees about the union, stated that “[o]ne of these days I’m going to snap and when I 
do, I don’t know what is going to happen”158—may also chill employee rights.
These comments are exactly the sort of behavior that the Act was intended to 
prevent, and they should be considered unlawful absent a satisfactory rebuttal by the 
employer.  Yet, the Board’s current right-to-access analysis frequently ignore s such 
threats if it determines that the employer had a right to exclude the organizers.159 The 
organizers’ presence on the employer’s private property, however, does not reduce the 
likelihood that employees would tend to believe that they would be a target of the official
“snapping” should they seek to unionize.
authorization cards); Martin Arsham Sewing Co., 244 N.L.R.B. 918, 922 (1978) (hitting union agent during 
strike with employees watching).
156
 2003 WL 22295366, at *26-*27.  
157 Id. at *2 (quoting Unbelievable, Inc., 323 N.L.R.B. 815, 816 (1997)).  The ALJ found that the comment 
was lawful because it was directed to another company official, not a union picketer or employee.  Id. at 
*26.  The Board appropriately disagreed, concluding that a threat of violence against a union picketer,
made in the presence of employees, tended to interfere with employees’ rights, no matter the officials’
intent.  Id. at *1; see supra note 117 and accompanying text (noting that intent is not necessary element of 
Section 8(a)(1) violation).  This issue implicates the Board’s “small-plant doctrine,” which recognizes that 
most employees of a plant with less than 100 employees will hear about, and have their rights chilled by, 
threats and other coercive conduct that they did not personally witness. See Schaeff, Inc. v. NLRB, 113 
F.3d 264, 268 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Roger D. Hughes Drywall, 344 N.L.R.B. No. 49, at 4 (2005) (finding
violations based on employer’s actions against union “without reference to whether these actions were 
witnessed by any of the employer’s statutory employees”). 
158
 2003 WL 22295366, at *27. The Board did not address the ALJ’s finding that this comment was not 
serious enough to constitute an unlawful threat.  Id. at *1 n.6, *26-*27.
159 See infra note 163 and accompanying text.
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Similarly, an employer trying to stop organizing activity could more directly
threaten employees by stating or implying that contact with organizers would be met with 
negative employment consequences .  Such threats, although not violent, are aimed at 
work conditions and are clearly the type of conduct that the NLRA seeks to eliminate.160
Accordingly, any employer attempt to stop organizing activity—even on property under 
its control—that directly or implicitly threatens organizers or employees shoul d be 
presumptively unlawful.
b. Harassment
Similar to threats, but often viewed as less serious, is the harassment of organizers
attempting to contact employees.  For example, on several occasions in Corporate 
Interiors, the employer turned on the sprinkler system or aimed a hose at the union 
organizers.161  The employer also spread horse manure where the organizers were 
picketing and allegedly drove a car at them.162
Although the Board found that these harassing acts violated Section 8(a)(1), the 
basis for that finding is an apt illustration of the need to change the current analysis.  The 
Board found the use of sprinklers to be unlawful because it was an attempt to remove the 
organizers from an area over which the employer had no right-to-exclude—not because 
160 The Court has long held that an employer violates Section 8(a)(1) by stating or implying that opting for 
collective-bargaining would cost them existing benefits.  See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 
618-19 (1969).  In determining the threatening nature of such statements, the Board looks to the context in 
which the statement was made.  See UAW v. NLRB, 834 F.2d 816, 822 (9th Cir. 1987).  For example, 
other unfair labor practices may make a seemingly innocuous statement appear threatening to employees.  
See id. at 822 (holding that other Section 8(a)(1) violations are relevant in determining whether employees 
would tend to view employer’s statement as threat); accord Allegheny Ludlum Corp. v. NLRB, 104 F.3d 
1354, 1365 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (finding unlawful coercion because of context in which statement was given).  
161 Id. at *28.  Although the employer argued that it frequently watered the area pursuant to its agreement to 
maintain the easement, testimony showed that the employer turned off the sprinklers when it called the 
police to the scene. Id.
162 Id. at *29.  Depending on the manner in which the employer was driving, this could be considered 
violence or a threat of violence, rather than harassment.  In Corporate Interiors, it appears that the 
employer did not intend to hit the picketers; rather, it merely wanted to move them out of the way. Id.
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the harassment infringed employee rights.163  This is an excellent example of why the 
current scheme poorly serves the NLRA.  Because the organizers in Corporate Interiors 
had numerous alternative means to contact employees, the employer’s harassment could 
not infringe the organizers’ derivative right to communicate with employees.164 Thus, it 
should not matter whether the employer had a state law right to exclude the organizers—
either way, they possessed no federal labor right to contact employees from that 
particular location. Yet, the Board’s decision suggests that had the organizing been on 
property that the employer controlled, the Board would have regarded the harassment as
lawful.  This makes little sense if the Board is focused on the infringement of derivative 
rights.  Moreover, regardless of where the organizers were located, a typical employee 
would view these acts as a clear signal that pursuing union representation would not be a 
wise career choice.
Instead of state property law, the Board’s concern should be whether the 
harassment affected the employees’ freedom to exercise their labor rights.  Under the 
proposal, this type of harassment would trigger a presumption that the employer
unlawfully interfered with employees’ rights.  Any reasonable emplo yee, for example,
would consider spraying water or spreading manure near organizers as an unnecessary 
provocation if the employer was merely attempting to protect its property interests.  The 
employer, therefore, should bear the burden of rebutting the presumption that employees 
would tend to view its conduct as targeting organizing activity and chilling their freedom 
163 Id.; see Marshall Field & Co., 98 NLRB 88, 103-04 (1952) (finding Section 8(a)(1) violation based on 
employer “forcibly” removing organizers because it evidenced improper attempt to exclude), enforced in 
relevant part, 200 F.2d 375, 379, 382 (7th Cir. 1952).
164 See supra notes 71-74 and accompanying text.
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to pursue unionization.165 Absent such evidence, the Board should find that harassment
of union organizers violates Section 8(a)(1).
c. Surveillance
Another major source of presumptively unlawful activity is an employer’s 
surveillance, or impression of surveillance, of employees’ interaction with organizers.  In 
safeguarding employees’ freedom to choose whether to unionize, the Board has long 
been sensitive to the dangers posed by employer conduct that may lead employees to fear 
that special efforts are being taken to monitor their involvement in protected activity.166
Accordingly, absent sufficient justification, an employer’s observance of employees
engaged in protected activity, or making an impression of such observance, will normally
interfere with employees’ labor rights.167
As the Board noted in Corporate Interiors, however, the lawfulness of employer
surveillance will often depend on whether the organizers are trespassing or the employer 
has an objective basis for believing that the organizers will trespass.168 This is due to a 
generally available defense that the employer can satisfy with evidence that it conducted 
165
 The employer could argue, hypothetically, that employees reasonably believed that the property was 
clearly the employer’s and that the union had resisted peaceful requests to leave recently sodded ground 
that had to be watered.
166 See Nat’l Steel & Shipbuilding Co. v. NLRB, 156 F.3d 1268, 1271 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (holding that 
photographing or videotaping protected activity has tendency to intimidate employees); Belcher Towing 
Co. v. NLRB, 726 F.2d 705, 708 (11th Cir. 1984) (holding that, although surveillance is not per se 
unlawful, it has “natural, if not presumptive, tendency to discourage [union] activity”); Corporate Interiors, 
2003 WL 22295366, at *27 (concluding that, absent proper justification, photographing or videotaping 
employees has “tendency to intimidate employees and plant a fear of reprisal”); Cook Family Foods, Ltd.,
311 NLRB 1299, 1301 (1993), enforcement denied on other grounds, 47 F.3d 809 (6th Cir. 1995).
167 See Snyder’s of Hanover v. NLRB, 39 Fed.Appx. 730, 736-37 (3d Cir. 2002) (watching employees take 
handbills); NLRB v. CWI of Md., Inc., 127 F.3d 319, 325-26 & n.3 (4th Cir. 1997) (impression of 
surveillance); United States Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 682 F.2d 98, 101-02 (3d Cir. 1982); Ingram Book Co., 
315 NLRB 515, 518 (1994).
168 Compare Corporate Interiors, 2003 WL 22295366, at *27 (“The Board has . . . recognized that the 
taking of pictures or videotaping to document trespassory activity for the purpose of making out a trespass 
claim is an acceptable justification.”), with NLRB v. Colonial Haven Nursing Home, Inc., 542 F.2d 691, 
701 (7th Cir. 1976) (holding that “anticipatory photographing of peaceful picketing in the event that 
something might happen does not justify an employer’s conduct”).
45
the surveillance to establish a valid trespass claim.169 Mirroring the current right-to-
access analysis, this trespassing defense is tied to the Board’s determination of state 
property law. In Corporate Interiors, therefore, the Board’s conclusion that the 
organizers were not trespassing meant that the employer’s surveillance was unlawful.170
The corollary is that a Board determination that the organizers were trespassing signifies 
that the surveillance would be valid. This is illogical, for the question whether the 
organizers were trespassing under state law says nothing about the surveillance’s effect 
on employees.171 The proposal, therefore, would make all surveillance presumptively 
unlawful, as employees will tend to view such conduct,172 no matter where it occurs, as
an attempt to monitor and interfere with their participation in organizing activity.173
An employer may attempt to rebut this presumption. Under current Board law, 
employers can justify surveillance where there is a reasonable threat of union violence or 
other misconduct that would affect the employer’s business.174  Moreover, some 
employer surveillance may be easier to defend where the organizing is on property that,
from the employees’ perspective, is clearly the employer’s.  For example, organizing
169 See Corporate Interiors, 2003 WL 22295366, at *27; Hoschton Garment Co., 279 NLRB 565, 566-67 
(1986) (distinguishing surveillance of trespassory versus nontrespassory union handbilling).
170
  2003 WL 22295366, at *27 (suggesting that reasonable basis for believing that trespass may occur 
could justify surveillance).
171 See Mike Yurosek & Son, 229 NLRB 152, 152 n.3 (1977) (stating that employer’s right-to-exclude is 
not relevant to surveillance issue), rejected as dictum by Hoschton Garment, 279 N.L.R.B. at 567.
172
 Surveillance requires more than the mere incidental observations that occur when an employer asks
organizers to leave or engages in its normal work routine.  However, videotaping, photographing, or 
posting someone to watch the organizing would be considered surveillance. See supra notes 167-168.
173 See Nat’l Steel, 156 F.3d at 1271 (holding that Section 8(a)(1) violation depends on tendency to coerce, 
regardless of actual impact); Colonial Haven, 542 F.2d at 701 (holding that actual coercion is unnecessary 
for Section 8(a)(1) violation; rather, “it is the tendency to interfere or coerce which is determinative”).
174 See Nat’l Steel, 156 F.3d at 1271 (holding that “reasonable, objective justification,” such as legitimate 
security interests, gathering evidence for legal proceeding, or reasonable anticipation of misconduct, will 
mitigate tendency to coerce).  Explaining to employees why the surveillance is necessary will be an 
important part of this rebuttal.  Cf. Teletech Holdings, Inc., 333 N.L.R.B. No. 56, 2001 WL 209470, at *3 
(2001) (concluding that employer must clarify for employees a facially overbroad no-distribution rule to
rebut presumption of unlawfulness).
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activity inside a store—like other unusual activity—would be expected to trigger some 
observation by the employer and would be unlikely to coerce employees. In contrast, 
organizing in a more remote area, such as a distant parking lot, would be less likely to 
warrant similar monitoring and employees may view surveillance there as a signal of 
employer hostility against unionization. Similarly, if the employer asks organizers to 
leave property that is arguably under its control and they refuse, employees would likely 
view the employer’s documentation of the possible trespass as an attempt to protect its 
property rights, not to chill their own rights.  Observations beyond that needed for a 
trespass claim—for instance, videotaping for an extended period of time, using more 
intrusive means than previously employed for non-union trespassers,175 or adopting other 
measures that employees would reasonably view as excessive176—would be insufficient
to rebut the presumption.
The Board’s approval of coercive surveillance based on its post hoc determination 
that a questionable state trespass claim was valid yields improper results and avoids the 
real issue at stake in these cases.  The proposal corrects this problem by focusing solely 
on employees’ reasonable perceptions of the surveillance, rather than state property law.  
Also, the proposal would permit a defense for employer monitoring of organizing activity 
in certain circumstances.  Under this defense, an employer may engage in limited 
surveillance to protect against conduct that employees reasonably, albeit mistakenly, 
perceive as a debatable trespass. The surveillance however, must be targeted only to the 
175 See infra Section III.A.2.d.  Moreover, if the surveillance occurs in a context that suggests more sinister 
motives, such as contemporaneous unfair labor practices, the rebuttal will likely fail.  See supra note 160.
176 For example, observations accompanied by an increase in security could undermine an employer’s 
rebuttal.  Cf. 6 W. Ltd. Corp. v. NLRB, 237 F.3d 767, 779 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding that increased security
was lawful because of reliable information about past union disturbances).
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possible trespass and must not occur in a context in which employees would tend to
believe that the observations were interfering with their labor rights.
d. Discrimination
An employer that exercises its right -to-exclude in a discriminatory fashion—such 
as a no-solicitation rule that applies only to union conduct—has presented special 
difficulties for the Board.  Babcock long-ago noted discrimination, along with the lack of 
reasonable alternatives to reach employees, as exceptions to its broad grant of employer 
authority to exclude nonemployee organizers.  Discrimination, however, is a markedly
different concern than the lack of reasonable alternatives. 
Although discrimination is an obvious target for Board regulation, the current 
practice of making it a categorical exception to the Babcock/Lechmere framework ill-
serves the Board’s ability to prevent truly harmful discrimination .  Rather than 
considering why discriminatory exclusions should be unlawful, the Board and courts 
have struggled to come up with a definition of discrimination which automatically 
triggers the exception.  A far better approach would involve a more disciplined analysis
that focuses on the labor law consequences of actions purported to be discriminatory.  
Therefore, instead of myopically determining whether a disparate exclusion policy 
qualifies as a categorical “exception,” the proposal treats discrimination as a potential
signal to employees that collective activity is not favored by their employer.
The problems in addressing discriminatory exclusions result from Babcock, which
carved out an exception to an employer’s right to remove organizers where it
“discriminate[s] against the union by allowing other distribution.”177  The Court never 
177 Babcock, 351 U.S. at 112; accord Lechmere, 502 U.S. at 535.  The discrimination exception applies also
to nonorganizing activity such as area standards and publicity picketing.  See Note, Deborah L. Stein, Keep 
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explained the basis for this exception178 and the two main possibilities under the Board’s 
current analysis are unsatisfying.
One rationale states that an employer’s refusal to allow labor organizing, while
permitting other solicitations, so weakens its property interests that they no longer trump
the organizer’s derivate right to communicate with employees.179  Doctrinally, this is 
nonsense.  Whether organizer’s derivate rights are satisfied has nothing to do with the 
employer’s property interests.180 Moreover, discriminatory access is perfectly consistent 
with the enforcement of an employer’s property interests.181  Deciding whom to grant 
access is an important right associated with property ownership. Thus, unequal access 
does not diminish an employer’s property interests.
The other reasoning is based on an employer’s union animus.  This explanation, 
however, is no more defensible than the property rights rationale.  Under Babcock, an 
employer’s discriminatory exclusion is a violation of Section 8(a)(1), which does not rely 
on intent.182 Quite simply, whether an employer’s discriminatory exclusion is motivated 
by good faith or by virulent hatred against unionization should not matter under Sectio n 
8(a)(1).  The proposal recognizes this important point.
Off the Grass:  Prohibiting Nonemployee Union Access Without Discriminating, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2029, 
2047-49 (1998) (citing cases).
178 See Stein, supra note 177, at 2049-54.
179 Cf. Be-Lo Stores v. NLRB, 126 F.3d 268, 284 (4th Cir. 1997) (stating that “[b]ecause nonemployees’
claims to access to an employer’s private property are at their nadir when the nonemployees wish to engage 
in protest or economic activities, as opposed to organizational activities, we seriously doubt, as do our 
colleagues in other circuits, that the Babcock & Wilcox disparate treatment exception, post-Lechmere,
applies to nonemployees who do not propose to engage in organizational activities”) (internal citation 
omitted) (citing Cleveland Real Estate Partners v. NLRB., 95 F.3d 457, 465 (6th Cir. 1996)). 
180 See Stein, supra note 177, at 2051 (noting that Lechmere appeared to forbid balancing of property 
interests against derivative rights); Estlund, supra note 7, at 322.
181 See supra note 56.
182 See supra note 117; Stein, supra note 177, at 2053-54; see also Zmija, supra note 55, at 126 (stating that 
discrimination may also violate Section 8(a)(3), which requires finding that employer had antiunion 
motive).
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Under the proposal, an employer’s discriminatory exclusion of organizers—even 
from property that is clearly the employer’s or where the organizers have reasonable 
alternatives for reaching employees—would be presumptively unlawful .  That violation 
does not rely on the employer’s property interests or motives.  Rather, illegality is 
presumed because barring organizing from the property, while allowing other types of 
solicitation, will tend to interfere with employees’ rights.  To be sure, such discrimination 
is often accompanied by an employer’s union animus, but even where it is not, the 
discrimination will tend to inform employees that negative consequences will follow if 
they pursue collective representation.  This analysis is consistent with Section 8(a)(1)’s 
concern for the effect on employees no matter the employer’s intent, and does not make 
the mistake of tying a violation to the employer’s property interests.
The proposal allows for a variety of definitions of discrimination while also 
providing assistance in choosing the most appropriate definition.  The Board and courts 
have struggled to define discrimination, providing wildly differing interpretations
including:  giving access to all group s but unions;183 allowing only work-related or 
isolated charitable solicitations;184 allowing all charitable solicitations;185 and favoring
183 See Sandusky Mall Co., 329 N.L.R.B. 618, 620 (1999) (concluding that “an employer that denies a 
union access while regularly allowing nonunion organizations to solicit and distribute on its property 
unlawfully discriminates against union solicitation”), enforcement denied in relevant part, 242 F.3d 682 
(6th Cir. 2001); Great Am., 322 N.L.R.B. 17, 24 (1996) (finding discrimination where employer excluded 
union, but allowed gift-wrapping fundraisers, Salvation Army solicitations, auto sales, circus fliers, 
Chamber of Commerce information, and heart and cancer fund solicitations).
184 See Lucille Salter Packard Children’s Hosp., 97 F.3d 583, 588-90 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (holding that 
excluding unions while allowing employee fringe-benefit program solicitations was not discriminatory, but 
permitting solicitations about home and automobile insurance, child and family services, and credit union 
membership was discriminatory); Four B Corp. v. NLRB, 163 F.3d 1177, 1183 (10th Cir. 1998); Be-Lo 
Stores, 318 NLRB 1, 13-15 (1995), enforcement denied in relevant part, 126 F.3d 268 (4th Cir. 1997).
185 See 6 West Ltd. Corp. v. NLRB, 237 F.3d 767, 780 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding that employer did not 
discriminate by allowing “innocent” employee solicitations for Girl Scout cookies, Christmas ornaments, 
and other purposes that “can be seen as beneficial to all employees,” but not allowing union solicitation by 
employees); Lucille Salter, 97 F.3d at 588 n.4 (noting that frequent charitable solicitations may provide 
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one union over another or allowing distributions by employers, but not unions.186 An 
employer’s facially neutral no-solicitation rule may also be deemed unlawful because it 
was adopted for a discriminatory purpose.187
These conflicting views derive largely from the Board and courts’ differing 
appreciation of employers’ property interests.  Yet, as noted, discriminatory access is
entirely consistent with the lawful exercise of property rights.188 The proposal, therefore,
focuses only on whether the discrimination tended to infringe employees’ labor rights.  
That focus should also shape the boundaries of unlawfully discriminatory exclusions—in 
particular, exclusions that tend to chill employees’ rights.  An appropriate rule would
regard an employer’s refusal to allow union access, while permitting access to any other 
group—even charities—as presumptively unlawful discrimination.189  Absent an 
employer’s rebuttal, this disparate treatment would tend to interfere with employees’
rights by sending them the message that the employer is not concerned about solicitations 
generally, but is instead targeting union messages.190
basis for discrimination finding); NLRB v. Pay Less Drug Stores NW, Inc., 1995 WL 323832, at *1 (9th 
Cir. May 25, 1995).
186 See Cleveland Real Estate Partners, 95 F.3d at 464-65; Stein, supra note 177, at 2046.  The Board has 
applied its non-acquiesce policy to the Sixth Circuit’s narrow interpretation of discrimination by refusing to 
follow Cleveland Real Estate Partners.  See Sandusky Mall, 329 N.L.R.B. at 620-21 & n.10; cf. Guardian 
Indus. Corp. v. NLRB, 49 F.3d 317, 320 (7th Cir. 1995) (suggesting “discrimination” depends on whether 
other activities with similar “character” as unions are permitted).
187 See, e.g., Youville Health Care Ctr., 326 N.L.R.B. 495, 495 (1998) (finding presumptively valid no-
solicitation rule to have violated Section 8(a)(1) because it was created in response to employees’ protected 
activity); Gould, Question, supra note 28, at 118-19 (proposing rule that looks to whether employer had 
previously announced solicitation limits).  Such cases may blur the line between violations of Section 
8(a)(1), which do not focus on intent, and Section 8(a)(3), which requires a finding of intent.  See 29 U.S.C. 
§ 158(a)(1), (a)(3); supra note 117.  If, from the employees’ point of view, the employer creates a rule in 
apparent response to protected activity, the rule will violate Section 8(a)(1) no matter the employer’s actual 
motive.  Cf. Youville, 326 N.L.R.B. at 495 (stating that “[t]here is no evidence that any rule restricting 
employee discussions of working conditions was previously imposed or made known to the employees”).
188 See supra note 56.
189 See supra note 183.  Despite this recommendation, the proposal could incorporate any interpretation of 
“discrimination.”
190
 For example, the policy in American Postal Workers Union v. NLRB, 370 F.3d 25 (D.C. Cir. 2004), not 
only prohibited all commercial and charitable solicitations, but also expressly proscribed solicitations either 
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Although the Board’s current discriminatory exclusion scheme, almost uniquely 
among right-to-access issues, does not require an examination of state law, it has been 
illogical and confusing.  The proposal will not fully resolve the differing interpretations 
of discrimination, yet it assists that determination by providing a far more consistent 
framework that turn s the Board’s attention to where it should have been all along—
determining whether the employer’s disparate exclusion tends to infringe employee 
rights.
B. Preemption
By keeping labor matters before the Board and property questions in state court, 
the proposal implicates the issue of labor preemption. The Board’s current analysis, 
which fails to maintain the dichotomy between the federal and state interests, has made 
the preemption question especially confusing.  Although the proposal does not 
dramatically alter the preemption analysis, it does simplify it under many circumstances.
Labor preemption of state trespass claims is governed by the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego District Council of Carpenters.191  Under
traditional Garmon preemption, the NLRA will generally preempt state lawsuits 
involving either conduct that is clearly protected or prohibited by the NLRA , or conduct 
that is arguably protected or prohibited where there is a danger to national labor policy in
allowing a state, rather than the Board, to examine the issue.192  The Court in Sears, 
for or against unionization.  Id. at 28-29.  Maintaining a general no-solicitation policy that also includes 
union solicitations helps protect against employees believing that union discussions are singled out.  
However, if the employer’s policy targeted only union solicitations—even if it required neutrality—it 
would have been far more likely to violate the Act.  Prohibiting only union material, even in an ostensibly 
neutral manner, sends a signal to employees that union activity is disfavored.  Id. at 28.
191
 436 U.S. 180 (1978).
192
 Id. at 187-88 & n.11 (citing San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959)).  Garmon
preemption can also occur against a federal Section 1983 claim, which is known as Golden State II
preemption.  See Golden St. Trans. Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103 (1989)).  The second major 
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however, modified this analysis by holding that there is a substantive difference between 
preemption of state trespass claims directed at conduct that is prohibited, as opposed to
protected, by the NLRA.193
Sears made clear that no significant conflict existed between a federal claim that 
union activity was prohibited by the NLRA and a state claim that the union was 
trespassing under state law; preemption of the trespass claim is not warranted in such a 
case because it is completely independent of the NLRA issue.194 What is less clear is 
whether the state and federal claims are distinct where the potential NLRA violation is an
employer’s response to an alleged trespass.  The better outcome would hold that unfair 
labor practice charges against the employer will not preempt a state trespass claim.  
Especially given Lechmere’s concern for state property interests, it makes little sense for 
a federal labor claim that relies entirely on state property law to preempt a state trespass 
claim. Federal labor preemption seeks to prevent state litigation from interfering with a 
unified federal labor policy; where that policy hinges solely on state property law, such 
interference is nonexistent.195
The only occasion when state resolution of a trespass claim will conflict with
federal labor law is where the union argues that the NLRA protects otherwise trespassory 
type of preemption is Machinists, a “dormant preemption” that precludes state regulation where the Act 
intends parties to freely engage in economic conflict. See Rum Creek Coal Sales, Inc. v. Caperton, 926 
F.2d 353, 366 (4th Cir. 1991) (holding that broad state exemption for labor-related trespass was preempted 
under Machinists) (citing Lodge 76, Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. Wisc. Employment Relations Comm’n, 
427 U.S. 132 (1976)).
193 Sears, 436 U.S. at 188-90.
194 Id. at 185-86 (citing NLRA claims under Section 8(b)(4)(D) and 8(b)(7)).
195 Sears, 436 U.S. at 188; cf. Michael H. Gottesman, Rethinking Labor Law Preemption:  State Laws 
Facilitating Unionization, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 355, 416-17 (1990) (arguing, pre-Lechmere, that state 
trespass actions will not be preempted where union does not allege that reasonable-alternatives exception 
applies).
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conduct.196 Absent such a claim, an unfair labor practice charge that challenges an 
employer’s exclusion of organizing activity should not preempt the employer’s state 
trespass claim against the union.  This allows the claims to be heard in their appropriate 
forums—the Board determines the federal labor issue and state courts address the state 
property question.
In spite of this logic, some courts have suggested that an NLRA charge against an 
employer will preempt a claim involving a traditional state area of regulation such as 
trespass.197 The influence of those cases is unclear, particularly after the Supreme 
Court’s recent holding that a federal statute’s express preemption rule—which blocks 
differing state requirements—will not preempt state suits that impose obligations at least 
equivalent to the federal requirements.198 That holding suggests a view that is unlikely to 
justify preemption of a state trespass claim where the federal labor question turns on state 
property law.199
196 This would occur where the union argues that no reasonable alternative means to contact employees 
exist.  Cf. Radcliffe v. Rainbow Constr. Co., 254 F.3d 772, 786 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that “because the 
Board ordinarily leaves to the State the question whether non-employee union activity may be conducted 
on the employer’s property,” and there is little risk of interference with NLRA’s enforcement, state claims 
for false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution will not be preempted); NLRB v. Calkins, 
187 F.3d 1080, 1094-95 (9th Cir. 1990) (rejecting employer’s claim that NLRA, post-Lechmere, preempts 
state laws that prevent employers from excluding union activity, because such laws are not inconsistent 
with NLRA).
197 See, e.g., Imondi v. Bar Harbor Airways, 1983 WL 2036, at *5-*6 (D. Me. June 1, 1983) (stating, in 
Railway Labor Act case, that NLRA would preempt state malicious prosecution for trespass claim, even 
where reasonable-alternatives exception does not provide union right-of-access).  Imondi was based in part 
on the questionable conclusion that malicious prosecution is not a state concern that is “deeply rooted in 
local feeling in responsibility.” Compare id., 1983 WL 2036, at *6, and Geske & Sons, Inc., 317 N.L.R.B. 
28, 53 (1995) (concluding that state claims for trade libel and tortuous interference with contractual 
relations and prospective advantage was preempted by NLRA because Board, which filed complaint, may 
find that state action would hinder federally protected union activity), with Pa. Nurses Ass’n v. Pa. State 
Educ. Ass’n, 90 F.3d 797, 803 (3rd Cir. 1996) (holding that trespass is “deeply rooted” and not preempted), 
and Radcliffe, 254 F.3d at 785 (holding that false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution are 
“deeply rooted”).
198
 Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 125 S. Ct. 1788, 1804 (2005).
199 Bates is only the most recent in a somewhat tortured series of federal preemption cases involving state 
law, particularly in the area of torts.  Thus, the long-term impact of Bates is unclear.  See Jennifer S. 
Hendricks, Preemption of Common Law Claims and the Prospects for FIFRA:  Justice Stevens Puts the 
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To the extent that confusion exists, the proposal simplifies the issue.  Because the 
Board will not look to state property law, there is no potential for conflict between state 
and federal law.200  It also eliminates the argument that warrants preempting state trespass 
claims because union access to an employer’s property is a central interest of the NLRA 
and the Court “has gone to some lengths to state exactly what [it] entails.”201 Under the 
proposal, the NLRA is unconcerned with the possibility that the union was trespassing.
Rather, the proposal recognizes the consistency in a state court determining that union
activity constituted a trespass under state law, and the Board finding that the employer’s 
attempt to remove the union violated the NLRA.  Accordingly, absent a union claim that 
it is entitled to access under the reasonable-alternatives exception, an unfair labor practice 
charge based on an employer’s exclusion should not preempt a state trespass claim.202
The analysis changes where the labor claim is based not on prohibited conduct, 
but on federally protected activity—such as union organizers defending a trespass claim 
by arguing that they  had a right-to-access under the reasonable-alternatives exception.203
The NLRA will generally preempt state trespass claims where clearly protected labor 
activity is at issue204; yet, the validity of a reasonable-alternatives claim is rarely, if ever, 
clear ex ante.  Thus, prior to Sears, preemption of a state trespass suit that involved a 
reasonable-alternatives defense was murky.
Genie Back in the Bottle, 15 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y FOR. 65 (2004) (discussing pre-Bates FIFRA-
preemption).
200
 The exception being a reasonable-alternatives claim.  See infra note 203.
201 Imondi, 1983 WL 2036, at *6.
202 Sears, 436 U.S. at 198.
203 If no other reasonable alternative means to communicate with workers exists, the NLRA gives 
organizers a derivative right to access an employer’s property, which serves as a trespassing defense. See 
supra note 52 and accompanying text.
204 See supra note 192.
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Because this defense initially requires an examination of federal labor law to 
determine whether reasonable alternatives existed, Sears recognized that preemption may 
be required to avoid state interference with a matter that is generally within the Board’s 
exclusive jurisdiction.205 Under Sears, therefore, a Board complaint alleging that an 
employer unlawfully excluded organizers that lacked reasonable alternative means  to 
contact employees will preempt the employer’s state trespass action.206
Board procedures further complicate the analysis, however.  The union in Sears
never invoked the Board’s jurisdiction by filing an unfair labor practice charge; instead it 
raised its reasonable-alternatives claim only as a defense to the state trespass suit.  Yet, as 
Sears emphasized, an employer is unable to invoke the Board’s jurisdiction to determine 
whether the NLRA provided the union with a right-to-access.  According to the Court, it 
is inappropriate to preempt an employer’s state trespass action based on a defense that the
union refused to raise before the Board, as it would deprive the employer an opportunity 
to have the issue heard at all.207 Preemption will be warranted only where the union filed 
a charge with the Board and alleged that the lack of reasonable alternatives gave it a right 
205 Sears, 436 U.S. at 200-01.
206 Id. at 207.  Sears did not answer whether preemption is triggered by a union charge raising the 
reasonable-alternatives defense, or whether the Board must first issue a complaint —which requires a 
finding that prima facie evidence of a violation exists.  Compare id. at 209 (arguing that “[t]he logical 
corollary of the Court’s reasoning is that” once union files charge, state trespass claim is preempted until 
Board refuses to issue complaint or rules against union) (Blackmun, J., concurring), with id. at 214 
(arguing that filing charge is not enough to preempt state cases, but leaving open whether Board’s issuance 
of complaint would suffice) (Powell, J., concurring).  The Board has avoided conflict by stating that, in 
cases implicating arguably protected activity, “preemption does not occur in the absence of Board 
involvement in the matter, and . . . upon the Board’s involvement, a lawsuit directed at arguably protected 
activity is preempted.”  Loehmann’s Plaza I, 305 N.L.R.B. 663, 669-70 (1991) (defining “involvement” as 
issuing complaint); accord Davis Supermarkets, Inc. v. NLRB, 2 F.3d 1162, 1179 (D.C. Cir. 1993) 
(approving Loehmann because it was more conservative than Sears majority, which “strongly suggested 
that the union’s filing of an unfair labor practice charge is sufficient in and of itself to trigger preemption”);
Hillhaven Oakland Nursing Ctr. v. Health Care Workers Union, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 11, 18 & n.9 (Cal. App. 
1996).  Many courts have suggested that filing a charge with the Board is sufficient to initiate preemption.  
See Davis, 2 F.3d at 1179; Reisbeck Food Mkts. v. UFCW, 185 W.Va. 12, 18-19 (1991) (citing cases).
Even if the Board issues a complaint, however, a union’s obstructive or violent conduct—issues that touch 
deeply rooted local responsibility—will not be preempted.  See Reisbeck, 185 W.Va. at 19-20.
207
 436 U.S. at 202.
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to access the employer’s property.  If the Board ultimately agrees with the union, the 
employer’s exclusion was unlawful and preemption will continue; if the Board rejects the 
union’s argument, the union loses its federal right-of-access defense and the employer 
can then pursue a state trespass claim.
The proposal maintains Sears’ preemption analysis where union organizers raise a 
reasonable-alternatives claim . However, the proposal clarifies the preemption question 
where organizers challenge the manner in which an employer tried to stop organizing 
activity.  Unlike the confusion wrought by the Board’s current analysis of an exclusion 
through the prism of state property law, the proposal’s elimination of the state law issue
obviates any question of preemption.  This allows the state to resolve whether the 
organizers were trespassing and the Board to address the manner in which an employer 
excluded the organizers.  The dichotomous jurisdiction encourages behavior that 
advances both state and federal interests.  Allowing states to address trespass claims 
quickly, and without the Board interference that may currently occur, discourages 
trespassing by organizers.  Similarly, permitting the Board to remedy unlawful employer 
conduct without getting bogged down in state law promotes the exercise of property 
interests in a manner that respects employees’ labor rights.  The result should be fewer
trespasses and fewer coercive attempts to stop organizing activity.208
208
 State claims under the proposal would also coincide with state anti-labor injunction laws that mirror the 
federal Norris-LaGuardia Act.  See 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115; N.Y. Labor Law § 807.  Although many state 
laws, such as the Norris-LaGuardia Act, prohibit injunctions against union organizing, an employer can 
generally seek to enjoin a union from trespassing while engaging in such activity.  See Sears, 436 U.S. at 
185 (emphasizing that employer’s attempt to obtain state injunction against trespass may proceed if it 
targeted only the location of union’s picketing and “asserted no claim that the picketing itself violated any 
state or federal law”); Waldbaum, Inc. v. United Farm Workers, 383 N.Y.S.2d 957, 968 (N.Y. Sup. 1976) 
(holding that, under state anti-labor injunction statute, ‘[w]here illegal acts have been committed in the 
course of [otherwise lawful and protected] picketing . . .  injunctive relief may be warranted” if statute’s 
procedural requirements are satisfied).
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C. A New Conception of Unions’ Derivative Rights
One incident in Corporate Interiors nicely distills the proposal’s advantages over 
the current scheme.  At issue was the union’s attempt to communicate with employees
working on a roof.209  The union obtained permission from the general contractor to be on 
the roof, but the employer later told union organizers that they would have to leave 
because the access ladder needed to be removed.210 Currently, the dispositive issue is 
whether the employer had a property interest that allowed it to exclude others from the
roof.  That makes little sense.  If employees were aware that the employer had a 
legitimate reason to remove the ladder—a safety concern, for instance—there should be 
no violation of the Act.  Absent circumstances that would lead employees to view the 
removal as threatening, or show that the union had no other reasonable means to 
communicate with employees, there were simply no labor interests at stake.  Conversely, 
if the Board found that the employer lacked a right-to-exclude under its current analysis, 
the employer would have automatically committed an unfair labor practice.211 This 
forces the employer to choose whether to enforce its arguable property rights or to avoid
risking  an NLRA violation by doing nothing—a decision made more difficult by the fact
that the property determination will generally take several years of litigation to resolve.212
The proposal eliminates this dilemma.  By looking to the circumstances of the 
removal, rather than the employer’s state property rights, the test focuses on the pertinent
209 Corporate Interiors, 2003 WL 22295366, at *30.
210 Id.
211 In Corporate Interiors, the Board found that the employer lacked a right to exclude the union because 
the general contractor gave the union permission to be on the roof; thus, the employer violated Section 
8(a)(1).  Id.
212
 The current analysis’s focus on state property rights also forces unions farther away from the targeted 
business—for instance, encouraging picketing at a mall entrance, rather than near the targeted store.  This 
may enmesh neutral employers into the labor dispute if customers think that the dispute involves the entire 
mall.  See Jean Country, 291 N.L.R.B. 11, 18 (1988).
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issue in right-to-access cases—the effect  on employees’ labor rights.  If employees would 
tend to perceive legitimate reasons for the removal, no NLRA violation exists.  If, 
however, the employees had reason to believe that the removal was an attempt to target 
unionization,213 a Section 8(a)(1) violation would be warranted.
Because employers would no longer face the uncertain choice of either allowing 
what may be a trespass or risking an unfair labor practice, the proposal allows them to 
pursue property rights claims214 as long as employees’ labor rights are not chilled. A
union, in turn, has an strong incentive to ensure ex ante that it engages in organizing 
activity without trespassing. That certainty allows the union to simply refuse an
employer’s request to stop because it is assured that further attempts by the employer to 
interfere with the organizing will violate the Act.  Moreover, where the union organizes 
on property over which control is unclear, it is likely to keep its activity peaceful and 
unobtrusive, as such conduct can be met at most by an equally unthreatening response by
the employer. This should reduce labor tensions—a major goal of the Act.215
Although an employer may still pursue its trespass claim, the inquiry takes place 
where it belongs—in state court, not before the Board.  It makes no sense to require a 
federal agency specializing in labor law to resolve state property issues.  Moreover, under 
Lechmere, where organizers have reasonable alternatives to reach employees and the 
employer’s attempt to remove the organizers is peaceful, the dispute does not implicate 
federal labor concerns.  The issue, instead, is purely a question of state property law. 
213 For example, Corporate Interiors involved numerous contemporaneous unfair labor practices, the 
employees apparently knew that the union had permission to be on the roof, and after the union organizers 
left, the employer stated:  “The only reason the ladders were taken was to get those fucking union guys off 
the roof.” Id., at *33.  Each of those factors, alone, would be sufficient to support a finding that the 
employer’s conduct would tend to infringe employee rights.
214 See supra notes 191-208 and accompanying text.
215 See supra notes 131, 142.
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Consequently, allowing state courts to resolve the dispute without Board involvement 
protects states’ interest in enforcing their own property laws and removes a frustrating 
and delay-ridden area from the Board’s docket.
The proposal also has advantages over other suggested alternatives to the current 
system.  Professor Cynthia Estlund, for example, has argued that the Lechmere analysis
should be replaced with a “good reasons” test.  This test would essentially use a Republic 
Aviation analysis for both employee and nonemployee activity on employer property.216
Although sensible, this would require an explicit reversal of Lechmere, which is not a 
realistic possibility in the near future.  Moreover, Estlund’s test would apply only where 
the employer possessed a right-to-exclude; she would maintain the current analysis where 
the employer lacks that right.217  The test, therefore, still suffers the ills of the Board’s 
reliance on state property law.218
To be sure, the proposal would create more uncertainty in cases where the 
property right issue is clear.  Yet, the questions raised in such cases are the Board’s 
forté—unlike state property rights inquiries.  More important, the current regime ignores 
the effect that an employer’s exclusion of organizers may have on employees’ freedom to 
exercise their labor rights.  The proposal avoids that shortcoming by protecting 
employees from interference by even well-meaning employers.
216
 Estlund, supra note 7, at 309, 348-49 (arguing that, to exclude protected activity from its private 
property, employer should be required to show “that the speakers’ presence or activity would actually 
interfere with continuing production, the delivery of services, physical safety or security of individuals on 
the premises, or to provide other substantial functional justifications”); see also Note, Sarah Korn, Property 
Rights and Job Security:  Workplace Solicitation by Nonemployee Union Organizers, 94 YALE L.J. 374, 
384, 393 (1984) (arguing for rule that focuses on employer’s legitimate managerial interests).
217
 Estlund, supra note 7, at 343-44.
218
 In Estlund’s defense, the Board’s reliance on state property law, and the problems associated with the 
analysis, were not necessarily apparent immediately after Lechmere.
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Finally, the proposal may be implemented without changes to either the NLRA or 
Supreme Court precedent.  That the Board has not made a consistent policy of addressing
the effect of employers’ conduct on employees does not mean that it cannot do so.  The 
Board’s authority to examine whether employer conduct tends to infringe employee 
rights is well-established.219  Indeed, the proposal’s focus on employee rights is more 
consistent with the NLRA  and Lechmere than the current analysis.220 In the end, this 
easily implemented change would provide better enforcement of federal labor rights and 
state property law, while eliminating a significant administrative problem for the Board 
and federal courts.
III. DOES UNION ACCESS CONSTITUTE A TAKING?
The Board’s right-to-access cases have long raised the issue whether federal labor 
rights risk unconstitutionally taking employers’ property.  Particularly where the Board 
determines that the Act provides organizers a right to access employer property, the threat
of a taking is pronounced.  Even while expanding the scope of takings, however, the 
Supreme Court has been careful to exclude labor right-to-access cases.  The proposal here 
would not alter those holdings.
Although granting access to organizers obviously limits an employer’s absolute 
authority over its property, takings jurisprudence has always acknowledged that not all
regulation of property must be compensated.  Indeed, property ownership rarely grants
unfettered control, especially where other rights are at issue; as the Court emphasized  in 
Babcock, “[o]rganizational rights are granted to workers by the same authority, the 
219 See supra note 15.
220 See supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
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National Government, that preserves property rights.”221  It is far from clear, therefore, 
that takings considerations are relevant in right-to-access cases.
The proposal does nothing to alter the current right-to-access scheme’s treatment 
under takings law.  The most likely prospect of finding a physical taking remains the 
same under either analysis:  where the Board requires unauthorized, nonemployee access 
to employer property because no other reasonable alternatives to communicate with
employees exist. Although property rights frequently trump other rights, the NLRA’s 
limited right-of-access requirement provides an exception under takings law.222
Federal supremacy, alone, should make NLRA restrictions on state property rights 
uncontroversial.223  Moreover, it has never been the case that ownership provided 
unlimited rights over property.224  Indeed, labor access rights are but one of many 
limitations on owners’ autonomy over their property.225
Soon after its enactment, the NLRA was interpreted to require unauthorized 
access to employer property under certain conditions.226  Some states incorporated these 
221
 351 U.S. at 112.  Moreover, as Chairman Gould noted, Justice Frankfurter long ago emphasized that 
property rights do not control the right-to-access issue.  Leslie Homes, Inc., 316 N.L.R.B. 123, 131 (1995) 
(Chairman Gould, concurring) (citing Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 511 (1946) (reversing Jehovah’s 
Witness’s criminal trespass conviction in company town) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)); see also Republic 
Aviation, 324 U.S. 793, 802 (1945) (holding that “[i]nconvience or even some dislocation of property
rights[] may be necessary in order to safeguard the right to collective bargaining”) (internal quotation 
marks omitted); State v. Shack, 58 N.J. 297, 305 (1971) (“A man’s right in his real property of course is not 
absolute.”).
222 See supra notes 4-7. 
223 See Estlund, supra note 7, at 311.
224 See, e.g., Winget v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 130 S.E.2d 363, 367 (S.C. 1963) (holding, in nuisance 
case, that “[a]n owner of property even in the conduct of a lawful business thereon is subject to reasonable 
limitations”).
225
 Numerous statutes, regulations, and common law doctrines limit a property owner’s right-to-exclude 
without constituting a taking.  See, e.g., Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200, 217 n.21 (1994) 
(noting that mining regulations may justify limits on private property interests); Joseph William Singer, 
INTRODUCTION TO PROPERTY 34-39, 45-85 (2d ed. 2005) (discussing common law and legislative public 
accommodation limitations); Zmija, supra note 55, at 105-10 (noting employment, zoning, safety, and 
other types of laws that shape scope of property rights); Powell, The Relationship Between Property Rights 
and Civil Rights, 15 Hastings L.J. 135, 148 (1963) (describing examples of valid limits on property rights).
226 See supra Section I.
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rulings by defining property rights as lacking a right-to-exclude where labor law grants
access.  In California, for example, it is a misdemeanor to refuse to leave private property
following the owner’s request, except where state or federal labor law permits access to 
the property.227
Perhaps reflecting this history, as well as the fact that the reasonable-alternatives 
exception was its own invention, the Court has expressly stated that the Board’s current 
right-to-access analysis does not constitute a taking.228 Importantly, nonemployee access 
under this rule is temporary and is not permitted to interfere with the owner’s, or its 
invitees’, use of the property.229 As the Court has emphasized, intrusion is allowed only 
to the limited extent necessary to help employees exercise their right to communicate 
with organizers during a representational campaign.230 Thus, access under the
reasonable-alternatives exception is rare and “the ‘yielding of property rights it may 
require is both temporary and minimal.’”231
The limited nature of organizers’ right-to-access is vital to the conclusion that it 
does not run afoul of the Fifth Amendment’s restrictions on permanent, physical 
intrusions.232 The Court made this point clear in PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 
227
 Cal. Penal Code § 602(n); see also W.Va. Code § 61-3B-3 (exempting labor disputes from criminal 
trespass liability).  Some of these statutes may have been a direct response to Sears and other Supreme 
Court cases addressing conflicts between state law and federal labor law.  See Rum Creek Coal Sales, Inc. 
v. Caperton, 926 F.2d 353, 355-56 & n.2, 363-64 (4th Cir. 1991) (discussing West Virginia statute and
comparing laws in California, Hawaii, Louisiana, and New Mexico).
228 See infra note 236.
229 Cf. Quietflex Mfg. Co., 344 N.L.R.B. No. 130 (2005) (finding that employer lawfully fired employees 
who engaged in peaceful work stoppage in employer’s parking lot because 12-hour stoppage was too long).
230
 Central Hardware Co. v. NLRB, 407 U.S. 539, 544-45 (1972) (stating also that contact can be restricted 
to nonwork areas).  As noted, the Board’s current analysis has since been applied to nonorganizational
union activity that is directly protected, such as area standards handbilling.  However, this extension of 
Babcock represents more, not less, protection for employer property rights. See supra notes 58-62 and 
accompanying text.
231 Central Hardware, 407 U.S. at 545.
232 See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426, 435 (1982) (holding that 
placing permanent cable boxes on apartment building was a taking); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 
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where it upheld a state prohibition against excluding expressive activity from shopping 
centers open to the public because, in part, the invasion of property was temporary.233
Although the proposal here would apply to public and non-public property, 234 the 
temporary nature of the access is crucial.  Even where organizers seek access to a 
worksite that is closed to the public—for instance, a remote logging camp—the need to 
protect employees’ labor rights easily fits under well-established law allowing limited, 
temporary intrusions onto private land.235 Indeed, shortly after PruneYard, the Court 
expressly distinguished NLRA-mandated access and permanent physical intrusions,
stating that the latter constituted takings but labor access rights did not.236
Organizer access also fails to constitute a taking under the Penn Central 
regulatory takings test, as it does not deprive the owner of all economic use of the 
property; the economic impact of access is low; its interference with reasonable 
investment-backed expectations is not significant; and the character of the Board’s grant 
U.S. 164, 176 (1979) (holding that permanent public access requirement for a pond connected to navigable 
water was a taking).
233
 447 U.S. 74, 84 (1980).
234 PruneYard downplayed the significance of the property’s openness, noting that past cases stressing  the 
open nature of the property were no longer good law. Id. at 81 (holding that private character of store and 
its property does not change by being in shopping center) (citing overruling of Food Employees v. Logan 
Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308 (1968), by Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976)).  But see Stevens, supra
note 74, at 1360-61 (suggesting that this type of access may be a taking). 
235 See, e.g., State v. Shack, 58 N.J. 297, 305 (1971) (holding that property owner lacked right to exclude 
government and nonprofit organizations trying to contact farmworkers living on property because it is an 
example of a “necessity . . . [that] may justify entry upon the lands of others”) (citing Prosser, TORTS § 24, 
127-29 (3d ed. 1964); 6A AM. LAW OF PROPERTY § 28.10, 31 (A. J. Casner ed. 1954); 52 Am. Jur., 
TRESPASS, §§ 40-41, 867-69); cf. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 125 S. Ct. 2074, 2082 (2005) (holding 
that regulatory takings jurisprudence “aims to identify regulatory actions that are functionally equivalent to 
the classic taking in which government directly appropriates private property or ousts the owner from his 
domain”).
236 Loretto, 458 U.S. at 434 & n.11 (holding that cable company’s “reliance on labor cases requiring 
companies to permit access to union organizers is . . . misplaced” because labor access is temporary and 
limited) (citing PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 84; Hudgens, 424 U.S. 507; Central Hardware, 407 U.S. at 545; 
NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105 (1956)).
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of access is confined to very limited circumstances.237 Moreover, the economic use of 
the property is preserved because employers may always impose reasonable time, place, 
and manner limitations and the NLRA will protect organizer access only if it is orderly 
and does not interfere with business.238  In short, access does not force an employer to 
shoulder a burden that the public as a whole should bear.239 Accordingly, preventing
employers from excluding organizers’ attempt to communicate with workers where no 
reasonable alternatives exist does not impose an unconstitutional burden on employers’
property rights.240
The primary change under the proposal is to impose more restrictions on the 
means by which employers may try to exclude nonemployees.  However, this 
modification is less of a takings concern than the access provided under the reasonable-
alternatives exception. A rule that permits employer attempts to oust organizers from 
what is arguably its property, but only if it does so in a peaceful manner, does not begin 
to approach the substantial threshold of a regulatory taking.241 Rather, the rule is similar 
to the numerous limitations on the use of property that do not impose unconstitutional 
burdens.242 If the temporary, physical intrusion required under the reasonable-
alternatives exception is not a taking, then the proposal’s restrictions on the manner in 
237 See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978); accord Palazzolo v. Rhode 
Island, 533 U.S. 606, 617-18 (2001); supra note 52.
238 PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 84; supra notes 147-149.
239 Lingle, 125 S. Ct. at 2081-82; PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 82; Gregory M. Stein, Regulatory Takings and 
Ripeness in the Federal Courts, 48 VAND. L. REV. 1, 8-9 (1995).
240 See PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 83-84 (noting that, unlike permanent physical taking or requirement that 
expensive private marina must admit the public, requiring property owner to permit free speech in shopping
mall did not infringe right that was “so essential to the use or economic value of their property that the 
state-authorized limitation of it amounted to a ‘taking”) (citing Kaiser Aetna).
241 See supra notes 237-239.
242 See supra notes 7 and 224.
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which an employer can exclude organizing activity must surely be acceptable.243
Consequently, the proposal’s limitations on private property rights do not raise a serious 
takings issue.
CONCLUSION
The struggle between labor rights and property concerns has been arduous.  The 
ascension of property law has increasingly dominated the balance between the two 
competing interests.  The importance given to property rights, however, has resulted in a 
regime in which not only is the enforcement of labor rights impaired, but vindication of 
property rights is hindered as well.
The proposal attempts to rectify this situation through a logical scheme that 
remains consistent with the Supreme Court’s right-to-access holdings.  The new analysis 
would move the Board’s focus away from its skewed interpretation of organizers’
derivative rights in favor of a much more traditional and appropriate concern—the 
employees’ freedom to exercise their labor rights.  Through this shift, the Board would no 
longer have to examine state property law, thereby eliminating delayed and often ill-
conceived decisions by the Board and federal courts.  Instead, those issues would be 
decided in the forum where they belong—state court.
Similarly, the right of employees to choose freely whether or not to pursue 
collective representation is far better served by the proposal.  This fundamental goal of 
the NLRA has often been ignored by the Board ’s current analysis, under which property 
rights are determinative.  By looking to the manner in which an employer attempts to 
exercise its property interests, the proposal would ensure th at employees’ labor rights are 
243 Loretto, 458 U.S. at 436 (holding that potential physical taking is “qualitatively more severe than a 
regulation of the use of property, even a regulation that imposes affirmative duties on the owner, since the 
owner may have no control over the timing, extent, or nature of the invasion”).
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protected.  Employees’ ability to learn about unionization would also be enhanced, as 
coercive attempts to exclude union organizing would be prohibited, even on company 
property.  Employers benefit as well, for they no longer have to face the choice between 
protecting an arguable property interest and risking a violation of the NLRA; instead,
they would be free to test their property claim as long as they do so without infringing 
employee rights.  The potential for conflict would also be alleviated, as unions that 
peacefully organize are assured that an employer would respond in kind or face a n unfair 
labor practice finding.
Although state property law and federal labor law have become inexorably 
entwined, they are discrete interests that can be independently resolved.  Whether
organizing activity constitutes a trespass is a question best left to state courts, and the 
answer is generally unrelated to contemporaneous labor issues.  Further, except in limited 
circumstances, the locus of the organizing does not affect the question whether the 
employees’ labor rights were infringed.  That issue requires an examination of the 
manner in which the employer reacted to the organizing, which the Board has 
inexplicably disregarded more often than not.  By correcting this oversight, the proposal 
offers significant benefits for the enforcement of both federal labor policy and state 
property rights.
